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RESIDUAL-RISK MODEL FOR CLASSIFYING 
BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS
BRADLEY T. BORDEN*
ABSTRACT
 Tax law classifies business arrangements as one of three general structures: 
(1) disregarded arrangements, (2) tax partnerships, or (3) tax corporations. 
Since the enactment of the income tax in 1913, tax law has struggled unsuccess-
fully to develop an ideal model for classifying business arrangements. The cur-
rent model’s sole virtue is its simplicity, derived from formalistic, elective 
attributes. Its greatest shortcoming may be that it disregards the reasons par-
ties form business arrangements and the reasons they use economic items to re-
duce rent-seeking behavior and agency costs. That disregard often allows busi-
ness participants to choose their tax classification and minimize their taxes, 
which erodes the tax base and shifts tax burdens to others but does not alter the 
parties’ economic relationships. This Article rejects the current model and 
presents a classification model based on the economic theory of the firm. Eco-
nomic theory aids classification in three respects. First, it helps explain why 
parties form business arrangements. Second, it views business arrangements as 
nexuses of contracts composed of various parties. This view helps identify the 
economic aspects of business arrangements and the economic rights of business 
participants, irrespective of legal form. Third, economic theory demonstrates 
that residual risk (the right to the residual assets of a business) measures the 
economic interests parties have in business arrangements. In particular, resi-
dual risk helps distinguish between arrangements that can trace income from 
its source to the owner of the source, or from allocations to the beneficiaries of 
those allocations, and those that cannot. That knowledge clarifies the appro-
priate tax regime for all arrangements and leads to the residual-risk model for 
classifying business arrangements.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Properly classifying business arrangements is essential to pre-
serving the integrity of the income tax system. The income tax sys-
tem uses various tax regimes, including partnership tax and corpo-
rate tax, to tax business participants. The application of those tax re-
gimes depends upon an arrangement’s classification as either a tax 
partnership or tax corporation. If the classification model does not 
properly match a business arrangement with a tax regime, members 
of the arrangement may receive the economic benefit from the ar-
rangement without shouldering the corresponding tax burden. That 
result occurs when the classification model fails to consider the eco-
nomic attributes of an arrangement. The current classification model 
fails to consider relevant economic aspects of business arrangements 
and undermines Congressional efforts to enact income tax laws that 
achieve specific tax policy objectives.1 Economic theory, on the other 
                                                                                                                    
 1. Commentators generally agree on fundamental policy criteria such as equity, effi-
ciency, simplicity, and administrability. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 143, 146–47 (1992) (analyzing the equity and efficiency of certain recove-
ries for injuries); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
807, 816, 829–30, 848–49 (2005) (evaluating transfer taxes using the principles of equity, 
efficiency, and simplicity); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 
STAN. L. REV. 567, 568, 569–72, 586–90 (1965) (arguing that a tax system should, among 
other things, supply adequate revenue, impose equal taxes, and avoid impairment of the 
market-oriented economy (i.e., promote efficiency)). Commentators may not, however, 
agree on the best system to achieve such policies. For example, they may disagree on the 
concept of income—some commentators believe consumption is the best concept of income 
while others believe a broader definition is more important. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, 
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1188 
(1974) (arguing that a cash flow tax is the ideal income tax); Joseph Bankman & David A. 
Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2006) (arguing in favor of a consumption definition of income); 
Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 400 (1979) (arguing that 
the income tax has worked well and that the cost of changing to another system would be 
too costly); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 
YALE L. J. 1081, 1082 (1980) (arguing that consumption tax unfairly excludes a significant 
portion of wealth from the tax base); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 931-32 (1975) (criticizing 
Professor William D. Andrews’s argument in favor of a consumption tax). Although such 
concepts are crucial to a just tax system, the discussion of classifying business arrange-
ments does not have to consider which decision is preferable. Instead, this Article argues 
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hand, provides residual risk (the right to the residual assets of a 
business) as a method for measuring parties’ economic interests in 
business arrangements. As a measure of economic interest, residual 
risk should dictate the tax regime that applies to the various types of 
business arrangements, and it should order their classification. 
 Two examples illustrate the deficiencies of the current classifica-
tion model. First, the current model allows parties to alter the cha-
racter of the arrangement’s income. The income tax system imposes a 
tax rate structure on income earned as compensation for services 
(which can be as high as thirty-five percent)2 and a separate rate 
structure on gains from the sale of certain capital assets (which gen-
erally will not exceed fifteen percent).3 Traditionally, employment 
contracts memorialize service arrangements, and payments made to 
the service provider pursuant to such contracts should be compensa-
tion for services. Parties may, however, create an economically 
equivalent arrangement using a limited liability company or limited 
partnership.4 The current model disregards an arrangement memo-
rialized by an employment contract, but it most likely treats the 
same arrangement as a tax partnership if memorialized by a part-
nership or limited liability company agreement.5 That different clas-
sification may affect the character of income a service provider re-
ports on a tax return. Income a partnership allocates to a service-
providing partner could be long-term capital gains taxed at favorable 
rates, while amounts paid under an employment contract would be 
compensation taxed at higher rates.6 Thus, the current model allows 
business participants to alter the character of income by changing 
the form, but not the substance of a transaction. That ability under-
                                                                                                                    
that classifications should help preserve the general tax system by creating definitions 
that help ensure that tax items follow economic items.  
 2. See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2006) (setting the maximum individual tax rate at thirty-five 
percent for tax years beginning in 2003). 
 3. See I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d) (2006) (imposing a tax on individuals and providing the gen-
eral graduated rate structures for individual tax liability); I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006) (pro-
viding preferential rates for adjusted net capital gain). 
 4. See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES
743, 746–52 (2009) (demonstrating that investment advisors use entity structures to convert the 
character of income without altering the economic aspects of an employment arrangement).  
 5. See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 
VA. L. REV. 715, 731–33 (2008) (concluding with thinly-constructed analysis that such ar-
rangements are tax partnerships and the partners act in a partnership capacity). But see
Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262493 (arguing that such arrangements 
should not be tax partnerships, or the service providers should be treated as nonpartners); 
Douglas L. Longhofer, The Lost Regulations: Section 707 and the Definition of Partner Ca-
pacity 11 BUS. ENT. 16, 26-29 (2009) (suggesting that a more rigorous analysis is needed to 
determine if service-providing partners act in partner capacity).  
 6. See Polsky, supra note 4, at 752–62 (describing the manager’s tax goal in fee conver-
sions and suggesting the proper tax treatment should be to disallow favorable tax treatment). 
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mines any income tax law and policy that supports the different tax 
rates.
 Second, the current model allows business participants to skirt 
the assignment of income doctrine. The assignment of income doc-
trine provides generally that a person who realizes an economic bene-
fit must report the corresponding tax item on a tax return.7 Conse-
quently, a person who receives compensation for providing services 
must report compensation income on a tax return.8 A person who rea-
lizes economic gain on the disposition of property must report a cor-
responding tax gain.9 The current model allows parties to shift the 
incidence of taxation by contributing property or services to an ar-
rangement classified as a tax partnership or tax corporation.10 Thus, 
the current model frustrates the assignment of income doctrine.11 The 
shortcomings of the current model exist because the model developed 
independent of economic theory.  
 Section II of this Article traces the evolution of the current classi-
fication model, revealing three significant points. First, the model 
undergoes significant changes every few decades.12 Second, the model 
                                                                                                                    
 7. See Brant J. Hellwig, The Supreme Court’s Casual Use of the Assignment of In-
come Doctrine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 765–81 (2006) (discussing the assignment of in-
come doctrine generally but arguing that it should apply only to gratuitous assignments of 
income); Stanley S. Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Tax-
able Person, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 796–815 (1933) (discussing the application of the as-
signment of income doctrine in various contexts). 
 8. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930) (holding that a husband could not 
shift the tax liability of his compensation to his wife). 
 9. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 124–25 (1940) (holding that the person who 
owns property must recognize income from that property). 
 10. See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of 
Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 333–45 (2008) (demonstrating how partners 
may use the partnership allocation rules to separate the incidence of taxation from the 
economic items allocated to partners). 
 11. Another example is illustrative. If corporate marginal tax rates are lower than in-
dividual marginal tax rates, individuals, particularly high-income individuals, may be able 
to shelter some income from higher tax rates by using a tax corporation for income-
producing functions. See John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax 
Entities Universe: “Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do,” 78 TEX. L. REV.
885, 903–22 (2000) (discussing the use of entities taxed as corporations to shelter some in-
come from higher taxes). Parties will also structure ownership arrangements as open te-
nancies in common, which the IRS may not classify as tax partnerships, to obtain section 
1031 nonrecognition. See generally Bradley T. Borden, Open Tenancies-in-Common, 39 
SETON HALL L. REV. 387 (2009) (describing and analyzing a safe harbor provided by the 
IRS for parties seeking to avoid tax partnership classification).  
 12. The classification model originated in 1909 with the enactment of the 1909 Corpo-
rate Excise Tax and the Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 
185–87 (1911), which held that the definition of tax corporation depended upon whether 
the arrangement was organized under state law (adopting the grant theory). See infra text 
accompanying notes 65–71. The combination of the enactment of the corporate income tax 
in 1913 and the 1918 statutory definition of tax corporation that included associations led 
to the corporate resemblance test of tax corporation as expressed in 1934 regulations and 
the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935) 
(adopting the entity theory). See infra text accompanying notes 72–83. The 1954 Ninth 
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lags behind development of legal and economic theory, sometimes 
adopting concepts decades after they have lost relevance in other 
areas of the law.13 Third, the model lacks tax policy support. As the 
current model passes its ten-year anniversary, commentators have 
begun recognizing chinks in its armor, calling for changes or further 
examination of the model.14 Furthermore, changing business practic-
es mandate periodic reviews of established legal and tax rules, and 
the current economic climate compels a review of the current model 
for classifying tax entities. Finally, developments in economic theory 
shed new light on the analysis of the classification model.   
 A review of the current model reveals that it is wanting in many 
respects. For instance, it relies upon legal formalities, labels, and 
elections to classify business arrangements, enabling business partic-
ipants to privately influence the placement of the incidence of taxa-
tion.15 For example, if partnership tax law allows untaxed assign-
ments of tax items,16 business people may elect tax partnership clas-
sification to exploit the allocation rules and use tax items as consid-
eration.17 Additionally, if entity tax law does not concern itself with 
                                                                                                                    
Circuit decision in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 421-24 (9th Cir. 1954) led to the 
promulgation of the Kintner Regulations in 1960, which adopted a bright-line multi-factor 
test for determining whether an arrangement was a tax corporation. See infra text accom-
panying notes 84–97. In 1977, Wyoming enacted the first limited liability company statute, 
and the IRS privately ruled in 1980 that such an entity could be a tax partnership, creat-
ing a de facto classification election. See infra text accompanying notes 101–06. Finally, in 
1997, Treasury created the current model by promulgating the check-the-box regulations, 
which formalized and simplified the classification election (abandoning theory for the sake 
of simplicity). See infra text accompanying notes 107–13. Thus, the important dates in the 
evolution of the classification model are 1909–11, 1913–18, 1934–35, 1954–60, 1977–80, 
and 1997. Significant changes, therefore, appear to occur every fifteen to twenty years, 
suggesting another major change may occur over the next three to seven years.  
 13. Corporate law’s concept of corporations evolved from the original grant/concession 
theory (accepted in the nineteenth century), which recognized that states granted corpora-
tions the privilege of existence, to the entity theory, which recognized corporations as enti-
ties separate from their owners (well established by the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury). See infra text accompanying notes 48–55, 56–60. The entity theory is now being 
eroded by the economic view of corporations as nexuses of contracts. See infra text accom-
panying notes 142–45. 
 14. See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-
Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 406, 457-58 
(2005) (concluding that the current classification model adds attractive complexity to the 
tax system and results in tax deregulation); Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-
Box,” 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451 (2009) (suggesting that twelve years after the promulgation 
of the check-the-box classification regulations, the time is ripe for reconsidering them). 
 15. This Article uses the term “incidence of taxation” to refer to the obligation to pay 
tax, or the statutory incidence of taxation. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC 
FINANCE 304–29 (8th ed. 2008) (discussing tax shifting that occurs when the economic in-
cidence of taxation differs from the statutory incidence of taxation). 
 16. This Article uses the term “tax items” to describe items that factor into the com-
putation of taxable income. They include items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit. 
See I.R.C. § 704 (2006) (providing for the allocation of tax items).  
 17. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338–46 (demonstrating how taxpayers may use the 
partnership tax allocation rules to engage in tax-item transactions).  
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the accurate allocation of tax items, parties may elect corporate form 
and shift the incidence of taxation.18 The review also demonstrates 
that the current model fails to justify the various tax regimes. The 
model does not explain why entity tax is important or why tax law 
imposes a double tax on distributions from arrangements subject to 
entity taxation. The current model also fails to contemplate why tax 
law needs aggregate-plus taxation. Those failures make classification 
arbitrary and the application of the tax regimes inconsistent. Thus, 
the shortcomings of the current model threaten the integrity of the 
tax system. 
 This Article accepts as a premise of entity classification that clas-
sifying business arrangements should help ensure that tax items fol-
low economic items. That premise requires a person who realizes an 
economic benefit from providing services or owning property to report 
a corresponding tax item on a tax return. If tax items follow economic 
items, participants in business arrangements would not be able to al-
ter the character of income, delay the recognition of income, or oth-
erwise shift the tax burden using the classification rules. Such re-
sults help promote the accurate placement of the tax burden, which 
in turn promotes both equity and efficiency—two linchpins of tax pol-
icy.19 To ensure that tax items follow economic items, the classifica-
tion model should adopt a metric that accurately measures business 
participants’ economic interests.  
 Section III suggests that the economic concept of residual risk 
(rights to the residual assets of a business) is such a metric and  
demonstrates how it measures economic interests. Residual risk is  
an important component of the neoclassical theory of the firm, a 
theory that ignores the legal form of business arrangements and 
                                                                                                                    
 18. For example, a person with property that has significant built-in gain (i.e., the 
value of the property exceeds the property’s tax basis) may contribute such property to an 
entity taxed as a corporation with at least one other member. If the corporation later sells 
the property and pays tax on the property, the noncontributing shareholder bears a portion 
of the incidence of tax on the built-in gain, which should have been borne solely by the con-
tributing shareholder who held the property while the built-in gain accrued. See I.R.C. § 
362(a) (2006) (providing that a corporation takes a shareholder’s basis in contributed prop-
erty if the contribution is tax free). Partnership tax law recognizes this potentiality and 
helps ensure that the contributing partner bears the incidence of tax on the built-in gain to 
the extent reasonably possible. See I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
3(a)(1) (as amended in 2005). 
 19. See, e.g., Sneed, supra note 1, at 574–80; Edwin Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987) (using equity and efficiency to 
analyze the 1986 Act). Vertical equity, or distributive justice, is another important aspect 
of tax policy. Sneed, supra note 1, at 581–86. Accuracy is important to vertical equity be-
cause it identifies the different economic situations of different taxpayers. Vertical equity 
is less relevant to tax entity classification because once income is accurately determined, 
the appropriate distribution of the tax “is a matter of social taste and political debate.” Ri-
chard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113 (1990).  
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views them as nexuses of contracts.20 That theory considers the rights 
and obligations of management, bearers of residual risk, and other 
market participants.21 It also helps explain why parties form ar-
rangements and how they use economic items to influence behavior. 
Because tax law has traditionally drawn significantly from economic 
theory, its disregard of the economic theory of the firm in tax entity 
classification is unusual.22
 This Article introduces three types of residual risk that help 
measure business participants’ economic interests: (1) unitary resi-
dual risk, (2) allocation-dependent residual risk, and (3) distribution-
dependent risk. These various types of residual risk help classify 
business arrangements and determine the appropriate tax regime for 
each type of business arrangement. This Article demonstrates that 
members of arrangements with unitary residual risk can trace eco-
nomic items such as income and loss directly from the resources they 
control. The tax regime that naturally fits such arrangements is ag-
gregate taxation. Members of arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk cannot trace economic items directly from 
controlled resources. They may, however, trace economic items from 
privately ordered allocations that have independent economic signi-
ficance. Aggregate-plus taxation is the natural fit for such arrange-
ments. Finally, members of arrangements with distribution-
dependent residual risk cannot trace economic items directly from 
                                                                                                                    
 20. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (using the 
term “firm” to refer to a “legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships”). 
 21. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.
L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983) (“The chief mission of neoclassical economics is to understand 
how the price system coordinates the use of resources, not to understand the inner work-
ings of real firms.”); Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and 
Corporate Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 351, 357 (1983) (“The corporation, after all, is one 
member of a family of complex organizations, a common theory of which applies to all. Spe-
cifically, the same principles of hierarchical decomposition apply to every member of the 
set.”). Legal scholars use economic principles to understand business law generally and to 
explain its developments and the evolution of legal forms of entities. See, e.g., FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991) (explaining the structure of corporate law from an economic perspective); Henry 
Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006) (providing a 
detailed analysis of the evolution of the various legal forms of business entities available to 
business owners today).  
 22. Much of the early scholarly work on taxation and income tax came from econo-
mists. See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE (1929); DAVID RICARDO,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Prometheus Books 1996) (1911); 
EDWIN ROBERT ANDERSON SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (1911); HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY
(1938). This Article uses the term “tax law” to refer specifically to income tax law. The im-
portance of entity taxation extends beyond income tax law, but the analysis of all aspects 
of tax law would be too unwieldy for this project. Future work should consider whether the 
proposed model works for other areas of the law.  
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controlled resources or from privately ordered allocations. Thus, such 
arrangements are the natural subject of entity taxation.  
 Section IV draws from the analysis of the different types of resi-
dual risk and the matching tax regimes to create the residual-risk 
model for classifying business arrangements. The residual-risk model 
adopts the nexus of contract view of business arrangements and 
moves away from legal forms and elective regimes. By focusing on 
the economic rights of business participants, the residual-risk model 
will help ensure that tax items follow economic items and help elimi-
nate the private ordering of the incidence of taxation. Its reliance on 
economic principles helps reduce inaccuracies, inequity, and ineffi-
ciency and helps the classification of business arrangements more 
closely mirror current economic theory. 
II.   CURRENT CLASSIFICATION MODEL
 Tax law currently has three general tax regimes—aggregate taxa-
tion, aggregate-plus taxation, and entity taxation. The tax regimes 
are complex, but a few words describe each sufficiently to frame the 
discussion of how to classify business arrangements. Entity taxation 
recognizes entities separate from their members and imposes a tax at 
the entity level.23 Thus, arrangements subject to entity taxation re-
port income and pay an income tax.24 Entity taxation applies to tax 
corporations. Aggregate taxation completely disregards a business 
arrangement and taxes each member of the arrangement separately 
on income from the arrangement’s property or services.25 Aggregate 
taxation applies to disregarded arrangements. Aggregate-plus taxa-
tion disregards arrangements to the extent possible, but it adds enti-
ty tax components as needed to address the economic aspects and 
administrative needs of such arrangements.26 Arrangements subject 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Under the current tax system, owners of tax corporations are subject to double 
taxation—tax at the entity level and tax on distributions. See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2006) (impos-
ing a tax on corporations); I.R.C. § 301(c) (2006) (including distributions and dividends in 
gross income). Entity taxation does not, however, require double taxation. See DEPT OF THE 
TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992), availa-
ble at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/integration-paper/integration.pdf 
[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income 
Tax, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 114-42 (June 13, 2007) (recommending that corporate tax 
system be modified to tax corporate income only once). This Article focuses on the policy 
reasons for entity tax and for the most part leaves the debate over double taxation for a dif-
ferent venue. Nonetheless, to accurately place the incidence of taxation, the law may need 
to modify the rate structure of taxes on dividends or eliminate the tax. 
 24. See I.R.C. §11(a) (2006) (imposing a tax on corporations). 
 25. See, e.g., Hahn v. Comm’r, 22 T.C. 212, 214 (1954) (holding that members of a tenancy 
in common have income from the property equal to their ownership interests in the property).
 26. See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1121351 (describing the 
history, theory, and policy justification for aggregate-plus taxation).
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to aggregate-plus taxation file information returns but do not pay 
tax.27 Instead, the members of such arrangements pay tax on their al-
locable share of the arrangement’s income.28 Aggregate-plus taxation 
applies to tax partnerships. The current entity classification model 
also includes S corporations, which are qualified closely-held corpora-
tions.29 Originally, such arrangements were subject to entity taxa-
tion, but Congress realized that S corporations should not pay an ent-
ity tax because the entity subjected closely-held corporations to a tax 
that did not apply to partnerships, which were generally closely 
held.30 Therefore, Congress removed certain components from entity 
taxation to allow tax items to flow from the arrangement to the 
members, who pay taxes on such items.31 The removal of entity com-
ponents created entity-minus taxation. 
 Finally, the current classification model includes qualified tax 
partnerships. Qualified tax partnerships are arrangements that come 
within the definition of a tax partnership but elect out of partnership 
taxation.32 Such arrangements include investment partnerships and 
joint-production partnerships.33 Even though qualified tax partner-
ships are not subject to partnership tax rules, other provisions of the 
tax law may recognize them as tax partnerships.34 Thus, they are not 
subject to pure aggregate taxation. Instead, they are subject to a mild 
form of aggregate-plus taxation. Figure 1 represents the current 
model for classifying business arrangements.35
                                                                                                                    
 27. See I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (providing that partnerships are not subject to tax); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6031(a)-1(a) (as amended in 2005) (requiring partnerships to file returns). 
 28. See I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (providing that partners are liable in their individual ca-
pacities for tax on income of a partnership). 
 29. See I.R.C. § 1361(a) (2006) (providing that an S corporation is an electing small 
business corporation); I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006) (defining small business corporation to in-
clude only closely held corporations).
 30. See S. REP. NO. 85-1983, at 87 (1958) (providing that subchapter S benefits small 
corporations by removing the double tax). 
 31. See Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter S in a Check-the-
Box World, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 287, 322–30 (1999) (discussing the history of S corporations).
 32. See generally I.R.C. § 761(a) (2006). 
 33. See I.R.C. § 761(a)(1) (2006) (providing an election for tax partnerships availed of 
for investment purposes); I.R.C. § 761(a)(2) (2006) (providing an election for certain tax 
partnerships availed of for joint production of services or property). 
 34. See Bryant v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 848, 864 (1966) (“The partnership remains intact 
and other sections of the Code are applicable as if no exclusion existed.”).
 35. A more complete model would also include arrangements such as real estate in-
vestment trusts and foreign entities. For the sake of introducing the residual-risk model, 
this Article focuses only on those arrangements identified in Figure 1. Future work should 
consider the model that classifies other arrangements. See Bradley T. Borden, Policy and 
Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax Partnerships, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008) 
(introducing the tax entity classification spectrum). 
254 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:245 
 Figure 1 depicts the current classification model as a continuum. Tax 
law moves from aggregate taxation by degrees to entity taxation. The 
arrangements move concurrently from disregarded to entity status. As 
Figure 1 depicts, the definition of tax partnership separates disregarded 
arrangements from tax partnerships. The line separating tax partner-
ships from tax corporations (S corporations and C corporations36) is a 
state law classification or a check-the-box election.37 Qualified tax part-
nerships and S corporations are subsets of tax partnerships and tax cor-
porations, respectively. The figure also depicts how the various tax re-
gimes track the classification of business arrangements.  
 The following Section reveals the origin and evolution of the cur-
rent model. The discussion demonstrates that tax law has lagged be-
hind legal and economic theories and fails to match tax regimes with 
relevant economic and legal concepts of business arrangements.  
A.   Grant Theory and Corporate Resemblance 
 The origin and evolution of business arrangements sets the stage 
for discussing tax classifications. The natural form of business entity 
is the partnership, originating thousands of years ago.38 A typical an-
                                                                                                                    
 36. A C corporation is a tax entity subject to the entity tax provision in subchapter C 
of the Internal Revenue Code (Corporate Distributions and Adjustments). See 26 U.S.C. §§ 
301-385 (2006).  
 37. The modern classification model actually includes within the definition of “tax 
corporation” other state-created and foreign entities. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as 
amended in 2008). To simplify the discussion, this Article uses “state law corporation” to 
refer to all of the arrangements listed in the definition.  
 38. See generally ABRAHAM L. UDOVITCH, PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT IN MEDIEVAL 
ISLAM (1970) (discussing medieval Islamic partnerships); Borden, supra note 26; Hans-
mann et al., supra note 21, at 1356–61 (tracing partnerships to ancient Rome); Henry Fr. 
Lutz, Babylonian Partnerships, 4 J. ECON. & BUS. HIST. 555, 557–59 (1932) (tracing part-
nerships to the first recorded private business enterprises in ancient Babylon during the 
Hammurabi period (2057 to 1758 B.C.)). 
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cient merchant partnership divided investment and management 
among the partners.39 Such arrangements were attractive because 
investors, who exercised no control over the operations of the ar-
rangement, were liable only to the extent of their invested capital.40
Managers, on the other hand, brought little if any capital to the ar-
rangement but bore liability for losses incurred due to their mana-
gerial shortcomings.41 Such arrangements usually lasted only a short 
period—generally the duration of a single venture.42 The short dura-
tion and immediate settling of accounts provided liquidity for the in-
vestor.43 The investor’s creditors could not disrupt the venture be-
cause the manager was often isolated from the creditors of the inves-
tor, providing the arrangement with a weak form of entity shiel-
ding.44 In a simple economy with relatively small ventures, such un-
sophisticated short-term arrangements were suitable. In other ar-
rangements, the investors had the right to withdraw capital, recoup-
ing their investments and any rightful returns on the investment.45
Such arrangements also provided liquidity to the investors.  
 The evolution of business made simple arrangements inadequate 
for large-scale ventures. The longer distances traveled meant that 
investors had to wait longer for ventures to complete prescribed ac-
tivities. Frequent asset liquidations were cumbersome and ineffi-
cient, and the right to withdraw would threaten the longevity and 
success of larger ventures.46 Financially and geographically larger en-
terprises needed greater sums of capital but also needed to provide 
investors with liquidity and limited liability.47 Tools that provided 
limited liability, liquidity, and entity shielding in simpler arrange-
ments in a simpler economy became insufficient. Without preferred 
features in place, the cost of capital would have become prohibitive. 
The law reacted to the economic needs of larger enterprises by creat-
                                                                                                                    
 39. Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1360-61 (describing the Roman societas publi-
canorum, which included investors who exercised control and those who lacked control), 
1372–74 (describing the medieval Italian commenda, which “had two partners: a passive 
investor who provided capital, and a traveling trader (often the ship captain) who contri-
buted labor and initiative”). 
 40. See Lutz, supra note 38, at 559. 
 41. See id.
 42. See id. at 566.
 43. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1376–77 (explaining that tradable interests 
were necessary for entities with perpetual existence to provide investors with liquidity). 
 44. See id. at 1368, 1372–73 (noting that the manager’s liability for shortfalls also dis-
couraged distributions, providing another form of entity shielding). “[E]ntity shielding refers 
to rules that protect a firm’s assets from the personal creditors of its owners.” Id. at 1337. 
 45. See id. at 1388–91. 
 46. See id. at 1376. 
 47. See id. at 1376–79. 
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ing state-chartered, publicly traded joint stock companies as early as 
the fourteenth century.48
 Joint stock companies granted investors the right to sell their in-
terests in the company without the consent of other owners, satisfy-
ing the investors’ need for liquidity.49 Investors in joint stock compa-
nies also enjoyed limited liability, and the law provided entity shiel-
ding.50 Such features made the cost of capital affordable and facili-
tated the growth of private business enterprises. The state’s creation 
of early joint stock companies provided the company a monopoly to 
trade in a particular area, operate a particular asset, or perform 
some other specific function.51 The monopolies allowed businesses to 
grow financially and geographically.  
 The monopolistic nature of joint stock companies carried over to 
early corporations chartered in the colonies and later in the United 
States.52 Through the early nineteenth century, states granted corpo-
rate monopolies for quasi-governmental functions, such as operating 
canals, building roads, and providing financial services.53 From the 
grant of such monopolies emerged the “grant” or “concession” theory 
of corporations, which considered state law incorporation a grant or 
privilege for the pursuit of a public purpose.54 The grant theory rec-
ognized the corporation as an artificial being created by the state 
with powers strictly limited by its charter.55 Legislative bribery, polit-
ical favoritism, and monopoly eventually led to free incorporation, 
which made corporations universally available in the United States 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Genoa appears to have created the first joint stock company as early as 1346. See
William Mitchell, Early Forms of Partnership, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL HIST. 183, 193 (1909). England, Holland, and France created joint stock companies 
in the seventeenth century. See id. at 193–94. Joint stock companies descended from char-
tered trade gilds. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 
1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 108–10 (1888).  
 49. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1376–77. 
 50. See id. at 1378. 
 51. See id.; Williston, supra note 48, at 111 (listing banks, trading companies, and 
mines as examples of early joint stock companies). 
 52. See Simeon Eben Baldwin, History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colo-
nies and States, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HIST. 236, 243–55 (1909)
(giving examples of early chartered corporations in the colonies and early United States 
and identifying early corporate statutes).  
 53. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1394 (“In the late eighteenth and early ni-
neteenth centuries, state legislatures granted charters primarily to the same kinds of firms 
that Parliament had typically allowed to incorporate: those that built and ran canals, 
bridges, and turnpikes.”).  
 54. See Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1819) (“They are 
deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in 
most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.”); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revi-
sited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).  
 55. See Horwitz, supra note 54, at 181. 
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by the end of the eighteenth century.56 Such free incorporation un-
dermined the grant theory, and corporations became the preferred 
entity for large enterprises.57 Even though the rise of free incorpora-
tion weakened the grant theory, some commentators and law makers 
still considered incorporation a privilege into the twentieth century.58
 The entity concept followed on the heels of the grant theory, and 
lawmakers and commentators developed a list of entity characteris-
tics.59 Early twentieth century characteristics were: (1) free transfera-
bility of interests, (2) continuity of life, (3) limited liability, and (4) cen-
tralized management.60 At the turn of the twentieth century, partner-
ships, in contrast to corporations, were not considered entities.61 In-
stead, partnerships were considered aggregates of their members.62
 The formalities of early corporate laws made the corporate form 
unavailable to smaller businesses.63 Thus, smaller businesses gener-
ally could not enjoy limited liability and strong entity shielding at the 
turn of the twentieth century.64 The use of partnerships and corpora-
tions during that period reveals an understanding that large busi-
nesses (operated as corporations) needed entity shielding and limited 
liability to raise sufficient capital. The more intimate nature of a 
small business did not mandate those protections, so the partnership 
form sufficed for smaller arrangements.  
 In that environment, Congress enacted the Corporate Excise Tax 
of 1909, imposing a tax on the privilege of conducting business in 
corporate form.65 The limited scope of that act (it applied to corpora-
tions and joint stock companies or associations66) gave tax entity 
                                                                                                                    
 56. See id. Free incorporation did not immediately eliminate monopolistic corporate 
grants, which existed through the early nineteenth century. See supra note 53. 
 57. See Horwitz, supra note 54, at 181. 
 58. See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 141, 151–52 (1911) (recognizing 
that the corporate excise tax was a tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate or 
quasi-corporate form). 
 59. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corpo-
rate Income Tax, 66 IND. L. J. 53, 58–59 (1990). 
 60. Id. at 61. 
 61. See Horwitz, supra note 54, at 182. 
 62. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, Prefatory Note (1914), 6 U.L.A. 276 (2001). 
 63. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1395. 
 64. See id. at 1394–95; see also Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 55 (noting that the turn 
of the century also witnessed a transformation of capitalism from a system of owner-
managed firms to large nonowner-managed corporations); Richard Winchester, Corpora-
tions That Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm Profits in Historical Perspective, 19 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (describing particular aspects of the corporate tax in its 
earliest years in the United States). 
 65. See Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (requiring that a business 
“shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or 
doing business by such corporation”) (emphasis added). 
 66. The wording of the statute left some ambiguity about its scope. It applied to “every 
corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital 
stock represented by shares . . . .” Id. Treasury interpreted that language in a manner that 
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classification its modern significance.67 As interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, the corporate excise tax applied only to corporations 
and statutory joint stock companies organized under state law.68 That 
original model for classifying tax entities was formalistic, depending 
on the manner in which the arrangement was formed.  
 The excise tax on corporations reflected the grant theory’s focus on 
the corporate privilege.69 The Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the 
Act’s scope also reflects that view,70 even though substantive law’s 
understanding of corporations had adopted the entity view several 
years earlier. This demonstrates that modern tax law’s original enti-
ty classification model lagged behind the legal understanding of cor-
porations. To the Supreme Court’s credit, however, an excise tax on 
the corporate privilege does have some policy appeal. Because the 
state grants the corporate privilege and provides a setting for corpo-
rations to flourish, a tax on such privilege seems reasonable.71 With 
that justification, the tax should only apply to state-law corporations, 
so the Supreme Court’s ruling was consistent with the policy justifi-
cation for the tax.  
 Congress enacted the corporate excise tax out of concern that the 
Supreme Court might declare an income tax unconstitutional or be 
forced to overturn its earlier decision.72 The corporate excise tax was 
also a stopgap to appease income tax proponents while lawmakers 
worked to amend the Constitution to grant Congress the power to tax 
income.73 Following the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 
1913, which gave Congress the power to tax income “from whatever 
                                                                                                                    
applied the statute to corporations, joint stock companies, and associations. See Treas. Reg. 
31, T.D. 1571, 12 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131 (1909). The Supreme Court appeared to agree that 
associations, as long as they were organized under state law, could be an independent con-
cept. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 141, 151–52 (1911) (identifying the tax as on 
the privilege of doing business in corporate or quasi-corporate form). 
 67. The first U.S. tax law to distinguish between corporations and other entities was 
the Revenue Act of 1894, which imposed an entity level income tax on corporations but not 
on partnerships. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The Supreme 
Court declared the act unconstitutional within a year of its enactment. See generally Pol-
lock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), modified by 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). For a comprehensive review of the definition of “tax corporation up” to 1995, see 
generally Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH.
U. L. REV. 437 (1995).  
 68. See Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 185–87 (1911) (placing emphasis on whether 
an entity is organized under a state’s statute). 
 69. See source cited supra note 65. 
 70. See Eliot, 220 U.S. at 185–87 (emphasizing organization under state law). 
 71. See Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 100 (quoting President Taft as supporting the 
tax on the “ ‘privilege of doing business as an artificial entity’ ”). 
 72. See Hobbs, supra note 67, at 454–55. 
 73. Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 93. Although commentators and lawmakers de-
bated whether Pollock truly prevented the enactment of an income tax, enough doubt ex-
isted to warrant the amendment to the Constitution in 1913. See ERIK M. JENSEN, THE 
TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 56–66 (2005). 
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source derived, without apportionment,”74 Congress enacted a corpo-
rate income tax.75 That act specifically provided that partnerships 
were not subject to income tax, but partners would pay tax on their 
respective shares of partnership income.76 The corporate income tax 
applied only to “corporation[s], joint-stock compan[ies], or associa-
tion[s] . . . no matter how created or organized . . . .”77 This language 
eliminated the requirement that tax corporations be organized under 
a state statute and elevated legal substance over legal form. Some 
doubt lingered, however, about whether the definition included asso-
ciations. Subsequent legislation clarified that the corporate tax ap-
plied to associations.78 That modification required Treasury and 
courts to define association.  
 Early on, Treasury adopted regulations defining associations to 
include certain state-law partnerships and business trusts.79 Later, 
Treasury clarified the definition with regulations that listed entity 
characteristics: (1) profit-seeking activity, (2) continuity of existence, 
(3) centralization of management, (4) ability to hold property, (5) abil-
ity to sue and be sued, and (6) limited liability.80 Shortly thereafter, 
in 1935, the Supreme Court used the entity characteristics to hold 
that a trust resembling a corporation was a tax corporation.81 The 
Court’s use of the entity characteristics became known as the corpo-
rate resemblance test.82 Thus, more than thirty years after substan-
tive law adopted an entity view of corporations, tax law incorporated 
that view into its classification model.  
                                                                                                                    
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 75. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.G.(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172. 
 76. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D., 38 Stat. 114, 169.  
 77. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.G.(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172. That statute was not with-
out its problems, however, respecting the definition of taxable entities. See Hobbs, supra note 
67, at 463–66 (explaining that the statute left unresolved whether the phrase “however 
created or organized” applied to each of the listed terms or only to insurance companies). 
 78. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1, 40 Stat. 1057, 1058 (defining tax corporation 
to include “associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies”).  
 79. The regulations provided that a trust would be an association for tax purposes if it 
engaged in business and the beneficiaries controlled the trustees’ activities. See Treas. Reg. 
45, art. 1504, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 591 (1921). Under the regulations, a part-
nership was an association for tax purposes if its interests were freely transferable and 
some of the members were passive investors. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1503, T.D. 3146, 23 
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 591–92 (1921). A limited partnership was an association for tax pur-
poses if the partnership provided limited liability, freely transferable interests, and the 
right to sue in the name of the partnership. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. 
Dec. Int. Rev. 592 (1921).  
 80. Hobbs, supra note 67, at 476; see Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-3 (1934) (describing cha-
racteristics that cause a trust to be a tax corporation). 
 81. See Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1935) (finding that the trust held 
title to property, had centralized management, continuity of existence, provided owners li-
mited liability, and carried on a real estate development business). 
 82. Hobbs, supra note 67, at 478. 
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 The classification model’s use of the entity characteristics is a 
mystery from a tax policy perspective. The statute required a division 
between arrangements subject to the corporate tax and arrange-
ments not subject to the corporate tax. An accurate division would 
require a clear policy position for entity taxation. Such a position was 
nonexistent.83 The lack of clear policy reasons for the corporate in-
come tax indicates that the courts and Treasury adopted the corpo-
rate resemblance test merely to clarify ambiguous terms. The charac-
teristics themselves did not define parties’ economic interests, but 
the law did not adequately express the economic interests the corpo-
rate tax should cover. 
 In 1954, the corporate resemblance test cost the IRS a challenge of 
a taxpayer’s corporate classification.84 Treasury followed that defeat 
by amending its regulations to include the characteristics and estab-
lish that each characteristic has equal weight. Additionally, Treasury 
regulations were amended to provide that an arrangement must pos-
sess more than half the characteristics to be a tax corporation.85 The 
new regulations became known as the Kintner Regulations, taking 
the name of the case the IRS lost.86 The Kintner Regulations ended 
any connection between the substantive law understanding of entity 
classification and tax law’s classification model. Substantive law rec-
ognized entity characteristics but did not have a bright-line scorecard 
for classifying arrangements. Recall from above that the substantive 
law developed legal forms with entity characteristics to meet the de-
mands of economic activity.87 Owners of capital and labor needed ent-
ity shielding, limited liability, perpetual business forms, centralized 
management, and investor liquidity to successfully and efficiently 
conduct business in the expanding economy.88 Such characteristics 
are attractive to members of smaller business arrangements and, as 
corporations became accessible to all forms of business, more small 
businesses incorporated.89 The business and economic needs for such 
characteristics explain their existence, but the characteristics do not 
justify a model for classifying tax entities. Such characteristics may 
not affect the economic rights of the parties. 
                                                                                                                    
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 90–96. 
 84. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that an 
unincorporated association to practice medicine and “endowed with the ‘attributes of a cor-
poration’ ” by the members was a tax corporation). 
 85. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), -2(a)(3) (1961) (listing the following slightly dif-
ferent characteristics: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the 
gains therefrom, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) liability for 
corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (6) free transferability of interests).  
 86. Hobbs, supra note 67, at 485. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 45–62. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 45–51. 
 89. Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1396. 
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 The Kintner Regulations’ lack of support may stem from the gen-
eral lack of policy support for corporate income tax. None of the rea-
sons espoused for enacting a corporate tax provide a satisfactory jus-
tification for entity taxation and its boundaries.90 An examination of 
just one convincing explanation reveals the general lack of tax policy 
justifications in this area. One explanation for the early corporate  
income tax is that Congress used it to obtain information from  
corporations that had grown significantly but remained unregu-
lated.91 That explanation may very well describe the motivation for 
the early corporate tax provisions, but subsequent securities regula-
tion would have made the rationale obsolete.92 Furthermore, the ra-
tionale does not reflect sound tax policy. The use of tax law to regu-
late business disguises Congress’s exercise of police power and di-
verts the taxing authority from its primary purpose of raising reve-
nue equitably and efficiently.  
 Over the decades, tax law has taxed corporate distributions at va-
rying rates, which generally imposed a double tax on corporate in-
come.93 Commentators have bemoaned the double tax and called for 
its repeal;94 and proponents have generally been unable to offer a sa-
tisfactory policy explanation for its existence. One explanation is the 
lock-in theory, which provides generally that management prefers 
the tax on corporate distributions because it creates a disincentive for 
                                                                                                                    
 90. For an in-depth critique of the various theories, see generally Field, supra note 14. 
One commentator argues in favor of the corporate income tax based largely on a variety of 
factors, including its progressive venture, ability to raise revenues efficiently, ability to 
prevent unlimited deferral, political acceptance, entrenchment in our current system, and 
the significant costs that would result from its repeal. See Kim Brooks, Learning to Live 
with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate Tax, 36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 621, 
630–54 (2003). Those arguments, although compelling in the existing environment, do not 
support the original enactment of the corporate income tax. Other commentators have be-
grudgingly agreed that antideferral justifies entity taxation. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, 
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Di-
mension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 503–06 (2008) (suggesting that the entity tax is a “crude, 
second-best anti-deferral device”). 
 91. See Kornhauser, supra note 59, at 113–33. 
 92. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (requiring registration 
of securities); Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006) (describing the information 
required in a registration statement).  
 93. See generally Winchester, supra note 64. 
 94. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT supra note 23, at 1–12 (identifying the distortive nature 
of a double-tax regime); Fred W. Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating Double Taxation of Corpo-
rate Dividends, 39 TAX LAW. 1, 2–5 (1985) (recounting the objections to double taxation); Ka-
therine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1098–1103 (2000) (recounting the equity and efficiency arguments against the corporate tax); 
George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L.
REV. 431, 431, 480–501 (1992) (recognizing that the double-tax on corporate income distorts 
the basic choice of entity and the choice between debt and equity financing and recommend-
ing two low rate taxes on distributed income to help eliminate distortions).  
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the owners to demand distributions.95 Although the lock-in theory 
may explain the continued existence of the tax on dividends from a 
public choice perspective, it does not support a satisfactory tax policy 
argument. Management’s business preferences should not dictate the 
direction of tax law. Finally, the entity characteristics that make 
lock-in possible, in particular entity shielding, are available to many 
arrangements that are not taxed as corporations.96
 With no satisfactory reason for the corporate tax and second tax 
on distributions, current corporate tax appears to be a product of  
tradition, surviving from the original 1909 act, and an extra source of 
revenue.97 Tax law appears to have merely adopted the substantive 
law concept of entity and the entity characteristics to define tax  
corporation. With no policy direction supporting such adoption, how-
ever, the law eventually became formalistic, abandoning any notion 
of policy support. 
B.   Elective Model and Private Ordering of Tax Liability 
 Despite their significant shortcomings, the Kintner Regulations 
became entrenched in the law. Tax planners began to obtain the clas-
sification that provided business owners the most favorable tax 
treatment.98 Using the Kintner Regulations and skilled document 
drafting, lawyers could create either a tax partnership or tax corpo-
ration according to their clients’ tax preferences.99 Creating entity 
characteristics through contract can, however, be cumbersome and 
add to the cost of business formation. To make characteristics more 
accessible to noncorporations, business people began lobbying state 
legislatures to create hybrid entities that would provide desired cha-
racteristics but grant leeway to avoid some entity characteristics.100
The Wyoming legislature responded to those efforts, creating the first 
                                                                                                                    
 95. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate 
Taxation, 105 YALE L. J. 325, 359–62 (1995) (arguing that managers often do not support 
the double tax, but they may if their interests diverge from shareholders and if they prefer 
retaining earnings within the corporation); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of 
the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889 (2006) (presenting historical evidence that the 
corporate income tax and tax on distributions is intended to discourage capital distribu-
tions from corporations). 
 96. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 502, 504 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 156, 156, 160 (2001) (limiting a 
creditor’s claim from a partner’s judgment to that partner’s transferable interest in the 
partnership). But see UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(1) (1997) (providing that the withdrawal of a 
partner in an at-will partnership will dissolve the partnership, eliminating the lock-in ef-
fect). The limited use of at-will partnerships suggests that the lock-in effect is fairly preva-
lent in businesses. 
 97. See generally Brooks, supra note 90, at 647–51.  
 98. See Field, supra note 14, at 75. 
 99. See Victor E. Fleischer, Note, “If it Looks Like a Duck”: Corporate Resemblance 
and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 527 (1996). 
 100. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 
U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 857 (1995). 
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limited liability company in 1977.101 Limited liability companies pro-
vide their members limited liability and sufficient drafting flexibility 
so they can avoid unwanted entity characteristics and tax corpora-
tion classification. After Wyoming created the limited liability com-
pany, the IRS blessed the classification of a properly structured li-
mited liability company as a tax partnership.102 A subsequent 1988 
ruling ignited an explosive growth of limited liability company acts.103
 The spread of limited liability company popularity was the result 
of economic needs converging with tax wants. Business arrange-
ments of all sizes needed some of the entity characteristics, but they 
also wanted the greatest possible flexibility in managing their tax af-
fairs. State limited liability company acts and the 1988 IRS ruling al-
lowed those two preferences to merge. Although an attractive combi-
nation to business owners, the merger of economic needs and tax 
wants neglects tax policy. 
 By ruling that limited liability companies could be tax partner-
ships, the IRS created a de facto elective regime for classifying tax 
entities. Such a classification model has serious policy deficiencies. 
First, an elective regime taxes similarly situated taxpayers different-
ly. For example, two entities could possess all of the same corporate 
characteristics other than continuity of life and free transferability of 
interests (which are arguably immaterial from a tax policy perspec-
tive), and tax law could treat them differently.104 Second, the elective 
regime created administrative complexity as taxpayers had to spend 
more resources to obtain the desired tax treatment, and the IRS had 
to spend more resources to consider tax entity classification.105 Such 
treatment favors the well-advised taxpayers and places a larger tax 
burden on the unrepresented taxpayer.106 Third, the de facto election 
allows business owners to privately affect the placement of the inci-
dence of taxation by modifying legal documents. As a result, the re-
gime is not efficient. 
 Even though inequity and inefficiency are legitimate policy con-
cerns, the regime itself focused on the significantly less substantial 
                                                                                                                    
 101. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537.  
 102. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980) (ruling that a limited liability 
company lacking continuity of life and free transferability of interests was a tax partnership).  
 103. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (ruling that a Wyoming limited liability company 
could be a tax partnership); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Cata-
lyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 403–04 (1996) 
(identifying that all fifty states had limited liability company statutes by 1996). 
 104. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980). 
 105. See Dean, supra note 14, at 453–55 (describing the complexity that arises when 
the choice of entity classification intersects with other provisions of a complex income tax 
structure and distinguishes between well-advised taxpayers and others). 
 106. This assumes that government revenue needs to remain constant, and where one 
individual’s tax burden decreases, another’s increases. 
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concern of administrative complexity. Commentators began advocat-
ing a de jure elective model that would replace the de facto elective 
model in the Kintner Regulations.107 The rationale appeared to be 
fairly straight forward: the current system was elective and complex, 
so a simple elective regime would be better.108 The promulgation of 
the check-the-box regulations is evidence that Treasury embraced the 
simplicity argument.109 The check-the-box regulations provide that all 
entities incorporated under state law are tax corporations, and all 
other multiple-member business entities are tax partnerships by de-
fault.110 Tax partnerships and single-member business entities may, 
however, elect to be tax corporations111—thus the appellation, “check-
the-box regulations.” 
 The check-the-box regulations simplified the elective classification 
model but exacerbated inequity and inefficiency.112 Under the check-
the-box regulations, tax law may treat two identical legal entities dif-
ferently. For example, an electing partnership is a tax corporation 
while a non-electing partnership is a tax partnership, even though 
they are legally and economically identical. Tax policy does not sup-
port sacrificing equity for simplicity, and commentators now criticize 
the elective classification model because it adds complexity to the tax 
system.113 Thus, the regulations arguably have no policy support.  
                                                                                                                    
 107. See Field, supra note 14, at 27-29. 
 108. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies 
and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regula-
tions, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 600 (1995) (suggesting the check-the-box election would simpl-
ify the classification process and recognizing that “the well advised have always been able 
to avoid the corporate tax by forming as a partnership or LLC that complies with the clas-
sification regulations or a corporation that pays out its earnings in deductible items or 
elects Subchapter S”).  
 109. See Preamble to the Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,989 (1996) (proposed May 13, 1996) (“Treasury and the IRS believe that it is appropriate 
to replace the increasingly formalistic rules under the [Kintner Regulations] with a much 
simpler approach that generally is elective.”). Commentators and practitioners generally 
hailed the promulgations of the check-the-box regulations as a good thing. See, e.g., Michael 
L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed ‘Check-the-Box’ Regulations, 71 TAX NOTES 1679, 
1681 (June 17, 1996) (suggesting that the regulations were good because they made the elec-
tion easier for sophisticated taxpayers, enabled less-sophisticated taxpayers to make the elec-
tion, and eliminated arbitrary rules). But see Aaron W. Brooks, Chuck the Box: Proposed Ent-
ity Classification Regulations Bring Bad Policy, 70 TAX NOTES 1669, 1674–76 (Mar. 18, 1996) 
(arguing that the check-the-box regulations would produce inequities).  
 110. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). “Business entity” is a term 
used in the check-the-box regulations to refer to any arrangement recognized as separate 
from its members. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2007). 
 111. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). 
 112. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 109, at 1674–76; Field, supra note 14, at 160-63. 
 113. See Field, supra note 14, at 52-67. See also Dean, supra note 14, at 453–55; 
George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimu-
lated by the “Check-the-Box” Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 130 (1997) (“The taxpayer 
must incur the transaction cost of evaluating all tax consequences of the available options 
before making an informed choice.”). 
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 The continuing evolution of legal entities provides business own-
ers significant leeway to privately order their tax affairs. From the 
relative statutory rigidity of the corporation to the almost unre-
stricted flexibility of statutory business trusts and general partner-
ships, business owners are able to choose the legal characteristics 
their entities will take.114 The check-the-box regulations allow busi-
ness owners to choose from an array of tax alternatives, regardless of 
business owners’ economic arrangements.115 Now, arrangements of 
all sizes possess entity characteristics and can choose their favored 
tax classification.116 Tax law has, therefore, by and large turned enti-
ty classification over to business owners.117 The current entity classi-
fication model prioritizes simplicity above economic reality. 
C.   Tax Partnership Versus Disregarded Arrangement 
 An often overlooked classification issue is the difference between 
tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements, which include em-
ployment, financing, leasing, and co-ownership arrangements.118
Business arrangements that are not tax corporations should general-
ly be tax partnerships or disregarded arrangements.119 Unlike the 
bright-line test that distinguishes tax partnerships from tax corpora-
tions, the undeveloped and confusing definition of tax partnership 
distinguishes tax partnerships from disregarded arrangements.120 An 
                                                                                                                    
 114. See Hansmann et al., supra note 21, at 1396–97 (describing the evolution of the 
law of business entities as a result of the tax entity classification rules and the most recent 
emergence of the statutory business trust, which grants entity shielding and limited liabil-
ity but otherwise leaves the contractual arrangement to the owners). 
 115. Commentators have also criticized the check-the-box regulations for their short-
comings with respect to non-U.S. entities. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Options 
to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, JCS-02-05 at 182–85 (Jan. 27, 
2005); American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 
TAX LAW. 649, 668-69 (2006). Tax entity classification requires significant attention. Un-
fortunately, the length of this Article does not permit a consideration of the entity classifi-
cation rules that apply to foreign entities. 
 116. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (providing an elective classifi-
cation regime); Hansmann, et al., supra note 21, at 1394–99 (explaining that business partic-
ipants have a significant variety of legal forms to choose from when forming an entity). 
 117. The only exception is for certain publicly traded arrangements, which the law 
treats as tax corporations. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006). 
 118. See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L.
REV. 925, 936–41 (2006). 
 119. Business arrangements also include real estate investment trusts and other types of 
tax arrangements. However, this Article confines its consideration to tax corporations, tax part-
nerships, and disregarded arrangements, leaving other arrangements for future consideration. 
 120. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, ¶ 3.01 (3d ed. 2004) (“The most basic, and 
perhaps the most difficult, problem in the taxation of partnerships and partners is the de-
termination whether a particular financial, business, or otherwise economic arrangement 
constitutes a partnership for income tax purposes.”); Bradley T. Borden, A Catalogue of Le-
gal Authority Addressing the Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, in 804 TAX PLANNING
FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC 
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arrangement that comes within the definition of tax partnership may 
use the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules for abusive 
purposes. For example, recent tax shelter transactions used sham 
partnerships to shield hundreds of millions of dollars of taxes from 
the government.121 Investment advisors use tax partnerships to con-
vert compensation into long-term capital gain.122 Partners may also 
use the allocation rules to gain tax advantages.123
 History partially explains the unclear definition of tax partner-
ship. Tax law originally disregarded tax partnerships in an era when 
legal theory was uncertain about the nature of tax partnerships, gen-
erally considering them aggregates of their owners.124 Partnership 
tax law added entity components to facilitate tax administration, but 
it has retained the aggregate view of tax partnerships to the extent 
possible.125 The initial disregard and later addition of entity compo-
nents describe aggregate-plus taxation. Tax policy, therefore, sug-
gests that the definition of tax partnership should include only ar-
rangements that require partnership tax accounting and reporting 
rules for the efficient administration of taxes. The evolution of the de-
finition does not, however, appear to recognize that policy norm. A 
review of existing law uncovers tests used to define tax partner-
ships,126 but nothing more than very general statements summarize 
the existing definition of tax partnership.  
 There are two questions regarding the federal definition of tax 
partnership. The first question is whether an arrangement is a tax 
partnership or an employment, financing, or leasing arrangement. 
This generally depends on whether the parties share control of the ar-
rangement.127 Such arrangements join services and property. If the 
                                                                                                                    
ALLIANCES 481, 495-542 (2008) (summarizing more than 125 statutes, cases, regulations, 
and rulings that have considered the definition of tax partnership); Borden, supra note 
118, at 970–1031 (exploring the current state of the definition of tax partnership).  
 121. See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Andantech 
L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003); SABA P’ship v. Comm’r, 273 F.3d 1135 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 122. See Polsky, supra note 4, at 752 (“The goal of management fee conversions is to 
convert current ordinary compensation income into deferred capital gain without affecting 
the basic economic arrangement between managers and investors.”). 
 123. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338–44. 
 124. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D., 38 Stat. 114, 169 (disregarding partnerships). 
The debates of Professors Judson A. Crane and William Draper Lewis illustrate the disagree-
ment about the nature of partnerships at the time Congress enacted the income tax. See gener-
ally Judson A. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762 (1915) 
(arguing that several provisions of the UPA treat partnerships as entities); William Draper 
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act—A Reply to Mr. Crane’s Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158 
(1915) (arguing that the UPA does not adopt an entity concept of partnerships).  
 125. See Borden, supra note 26, at 722. 
 126. See Borden, supra note 118, at 975–1001 (discussing ten tests that emerge from 
the case law and rulings). 
 127. See, e.g., Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514, 517 (D. Minn. 1955) (explaining that con-
trol is important in classifying an arrangement). 
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owner of property controls the arrangement, it should be an employ-
ment arrangement. If the owner of service controls the arrangement, it 
would likely be a lease or a loan.128 If the parties jointly control the 
property and provide services, the arrangement should be a tax part-
nership.129 However, the law does not clearly define the level of control 
the member must have for the arrangement to be a tax partnership.  
 The second question is whether an arrangement is a tax partner-
ship or a tenancy in common. The answer to that question generally 
depends on the source and type of services provided with respect to 
co-owned property.130 If co-owners provide no services with respect to 
the property and do not hire anyone to provide services with respect 
to the property, the arrangement should be a tenancy in common.131
Furthermore, if the co-owners provide no services and hire a manag-
er to provide customary tenant services, the arrangement should be a 
tenancy in common.132 If, however, one of the co-owners provides ser-
vices with respect to the property, or if a hired manager provides 
more than customary tenant services, the arrangement should be-
come a tax partnership.133
 Those general concepts derive from the authority addressing the 
definition of tax partnership, but reasonable people may disagree 
about the accuracy of such general conclusions. They also may dis-
pute the extent to which state law classification, other than corporate 
classification, should affect the definition of tax partnership. For ex-
ample, this Article argues that state law classification should not 
control the definition of tax partnership.134 If two parties own proper-
ty in a limited liability company and no services are provided with 
respect to the property, the arrangement should not be a tax partner-
ship.135 Otherwise, the definition of tax partnership could subject 
identical economic arrangements (a co-ownership and a limited liabil-
ity company, each with no activity) to different tax regimes.136 Other 
commentators may argue that all limited liability companies or other 
state law business entities (other than corporations and entities mak-
ing the check-the-box election) should be tax partnerships, regardless 
of the lack of entity-level activity.  
                                                                                                                    
 128. See Borden, supra note 26, at 744-52. 
 129. See Cusick v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 243 (1998) (finding that co-owners 
who contributed customary tenant services were partners). 
 130. See Borden, supra note 118, at 995–98. 
 131. See id. at 991–98. 
 132. See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261. 
 133. See Cusick, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 243 (finding that co-owners who contributed cus-
tomary tenant services were partners); Borden, supra note 118, at 994. 
 134. Borden, supra note 118, at 1010–11. 
 135. See id.
 136. See id. at 1011. 
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 The lack of a clear definition of tax partnership grants business 
participants leeway in structuring arrangements to qualify for the 
partnership tax rules. The choice between disregarded arrangement 
and tax partnership can, therefore, be elective for some arrange-
ments. Choosing between the two types of arrangements empowers 
business participants to privately order the placement of the tax bur-
den.137 Once within the definition of tax partnership, business people 
may further shift the tax burden using the allocation rules.138 Thus, 
the current definition of tax partnership neglects horizontal equity by 
allowing members of partnerships to obtain tax treatment that is un-
available to persons who are not members of tax partnerships. 
 In summary, state law and legal labels fail to provide a policy-
supported tax-classification model for business arrangements. In-
stead, such factors make tax classification elective and empower tax-
payers to privately order the tax burden. The shortfall of the current 
classification model is its neglect of the economic aspects of business 
arrangements. The economic theory of the firm helps explain the 
economic aspects of business arrangements. In particular, residual 
risk helps measure the economic aspects of an arrangement and pro-
vides a basis for classifying tax entities and subjecting them to the 
various tax regimes. 
III.   RESIDUAL RISK
 Residual risk is an economic concept that measures the economic 
rights and obligations of parties. Economic measures should signifi-
cantly affect the classification of business arrangements. Non-tax 
terms such as corporation, partnership, limited liability company, li-
mited partnership, and statutory trust become mere descriptions of 
various levels of off-the-rack state law contractual terms.139 The de-
fault terms vary in degree of rigidity from the strict provisions in 
corporate statutes to significant freedom of contract available to 
members of partnerships, limited liability companies, and statutory 
business trusts. Members of corporations often cannot “term-down” 
(i.e., relax the rules found in corporate statutes) corporate governing 
                                                                                                                    
 137. For example, if parties choose to structure an arrangement for services as an em-
ployment contract, payments to the service provider to terminate the contract will be ordi-
nary income. See Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1076–77 (1964). If the same arrangement 
were a limited liability company taxed as tax partnership, payments to terminate the 
partnership could be capital gain. See I.R.C. §§ 731(a), 741 (2006). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 4–6 (describing the use of limited liability companies to alter the classi-
fication of employment arrangements).  
 138. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338–40 (describing tax item transaction within  
tax partnerships). 
 139. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 34–35 (suggesting that state enti-
ty laws provide rules that are common in many contracts and save the parties having to 
negotiate such terms upon the formation of every new entity). 
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documents.140 Members of other legal entities can, however, “term-
up” (i.e., add contractual provisions that create corporate-like 
attributes for noncorporations) governing documents to create ar-
rangements that are economically and legally identical to corpora-
tions.141 The ability to create economic and legal equivalents with 
various types of legal forms suggests that the classification model 
should disregard legal forms.  
 The neoclassical economic understanding of the firm neglects legal 
formalities. It views the “private corporation or firm [as] simply one 
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relation-
ships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible re-
sidual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization . . . .”142
“[E]mphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other 
organizations focuses attention on . . . why particular sets of contrac-
tual relations arise for various types of organizations [and] what the 
consequences of these contractual relations are[.]”143 Such focus leads 
to a policy-based model for classifying business arrangements. View-
ing a business arrangement as a nexus of contracts allows tax law to 
consider the economic essence of the arrangement and assess the 
parties’ rights and obligations. Tax law can then apply a tax regime 
to the arrangement based upon the economic attributes that flow to 
the respective members of the arrangement. 
 In addition to viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts, economic 
theory embraces the concept of residual risk. Residual risk is “the dif-
ference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised pay-
ments to agents.”144 Consequently, bearers of residual risk share the 
residual assets of an arrangement after the arrangement has satisfied 
all of its obligations. In a corporation, the residual risk bearers are the 
shareholders; in a partnership, the residual risk bearers are the part-
ners. A sole proprietor or sole owner of property bears the residual risk 
                                                                                                                    
 140. For example, state law generally requires corporations to have at least one class of 
stock, make distributions according to the outstanding stock, and follow certain governance 
formalities. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) (1984) (amended 2007) (requiring at least 
one class of stock); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.05(a) (1984) (amended 2007) (requiring dis-
tributions in accordance with outstanding stock); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01–8.70 (1984) 
(amended 2007) (providing rules about meetings, voting, and directors and officers). 
 141. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, § 110 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 442, 442–44 (2008) (al-
lowing members of limited liability companies to adopt governing partnership agreements). 
 142. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 311. The nexus of contract view of the firm 
is not without its skeptics. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Cor-
poration: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (describing the nexus of con-
tract theory and suggesting that the economic theories cannot always be transported into 
the corporate law context). Many legal scholars have, nonetheless, incorporated the con-
cept into their work. Id. at 408, nn.5–6 (listing legal articles that incorporate the theory of 
the firm). 
 143. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 311. 
 144. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983). 
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of the business or property. The residual risk bearer’s claim to the re-
sidual assets of an arrangement represents that person’s residual 
claim. “The central contracts in any organization specify . . . the nature 
of residual claims . . . .”145 In the case of corporations, state law and the 
type and number of outstanding shares determine the shareholders’ 
residual claims.146 Members of the other commonly used legal entities 
establish the nature of residual claims by contract or rely upon state 
default rules.147 If an arrangement’s central contracts specify the na-
ture of the parties’ residual claims, they should take precedence over 
the form or label given to an arrangement.  
 A simple business model sets the stage for considering residual 
risk and identifying parties’ residual claims.148 Assume two people 
join together to form a business. Adrian contributes property worth 
$1,000,000 and agrees to help manage the business, and Bakke 
agrees to provide services. During the first year of operation, the 
business has $100,000 of profits. Every year thereafter, the profit of 
the business randomly fluctuates, reasonably representing the per-
formance of a typical business. The value of the property log normally 
fluctuates over the years, representing the expected gain or loss of  
a typical piece of property. Assuming the business does not make  
any distributions, the value of its residual assets will be the sum of 
the property value (the original $1,000,000 adjusted to reflect 
changes in its value following the formation of the business) and ac-
cumulated profits.149 The model assumes that the business has no 
goodwill or going concern value and that it can liquidate its assets 
with no transaction costs.150
 Using information from the hypothetical business’s performance 
and the arrangement’s governing rules, the parties could determine 
their shares of the arrangement’s residual value (i.e., their residual 
claims) at the end of each year. Their residual claims depend upon 
the type of entity they choose, the property’s change in value, and, if 
they choose a noncorporation, the method they use to allocate the 
                                                                                                                    
 145. Id. at 302. 
 146. See infra text accompanying notes 172–76. 
 147. See infra text accompanying notes 178–91(describing the various types of residual 
risk and the legal source of such risk).  
 148. Table 1 of the Appendix summarizes the hypothetical business’s performance over 
a ten-year period. 
 149. The use of profits as a metric incorporates expenses into the model. Profits for this 
purpose simply mean the excess of revenue over expenses. For the sake of analysis, the 
discussion assumes that profits equal taxable income, exclusive of any gain that may be 
realized on the disposition of the property.  
 150. Goodwill or going concern value will not substantively affect the analysis, as such 
items will merely add to the residual value of the firm. If the parties do not agree upon 
how to allocate any income from goodwill and going concern value, state law will determine 
the allocation of such amounts in the case of a partnership. See UNIF. P’SHIP. ACT § 103(a) 
(1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001).  
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profits. The hypothetical company helps describe the three types  
of residual risk that the parties may use: (1) unitary residual risk,  
(2) allocation-dependent residual risk, and (3) distribution-dependent 
residual risk. 
A.   Unitary Residual Risk 
 Unitary residual risk is the residual risk born by a single person. 
Sole proprietors and sole owners of property bear the unitary resi-
dual risk of the businesses and property. The residual claim in a 
piece of property is “the right to control all aspects of the asset that 
have not been explicitly given away by contract.”151 A contract be-
tween a printer and a publisher illustrates unitary residual risk.152 If 
the contract provides for a specific print job and contains no provision 
for an additional run, the party who has the right to decide whether 
to expand the print job or do another run holds the residual claim of 
the printer and bears its residual risk.153 Similarly, a person who con-
trols the performance of services with respect to a piece of property 
bears the residual risk of that property.154
 Consider how this concept of unitary residual risk informs the 
analysis of various disregarded arrangements. Adrian agrees that in 
exchange for Bakke providing services with respect to Adrian’s prop-
erty, Adrian will pay forty-five percent of the income from the proper-
ty to Bakke. The agreement does not have a specified duration. 
Bakke can stop providing services at any time, and Adrian can dis-
pose of the property at any time. If Bakke unilaterally terminates his 
services, Adrian may arrange for someone else to provide the servic-
es. Adrian may also alter the use of the property unilaterally (i.e., 
convert it from apartments to condominiums) and borrow against it 
without Bakke’s consent. The arrangement is an employment agree-
ment, and because Adrian controls all aspects of the asset that have 
not been explicitly contracted away, Adrian bears the unitary resi-
dual risk of the property.  
 Instead of hiring Bakke, Adrian may decide to grant Bakke the 
use of all or a portion of the property for a fixed period of time. The 
terms of the agreement may provide that Bakke will pay to Adrian 
forty-five percent of any income from the property in exchange for the 
right to use the property. Upon termination of the agreement, Adrian 
determines what to do with the property. This appears to be a lease, 
and Adrian bears the unitary residual risk of the property.  
                                                                                                                    
 151. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 695 (1986). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id.
 154. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 1119, 1121 (1990). 
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 Some arrangements obfuscate who bears the residual risk of prop-
erty. For example, the property may be farm land, and Adrian and 
Bakke may agree that Bakke will manage the land for a fixed period of 
time.155 The parties agree to share the produce from the farm equally. 
They also agree to share some of the costs of farming the land and 
growing the crops. Together, they decide which crops to plant. None-
theless, after the contract terminates, Adrian has the right to control 
all aspects of the land. Therefore, Adrian retains the unitary residual 
risk in the farmland, and the arrangement is a lease. 
 Notice that unitary residual risk is not concerned with the control 
of the property for the duration of an existing agreement.156 The focus 
is on who controls all aspects of the property following the termina-
tion of the arrangement. To illustrate, Adrian may allow Bakke to 
use $1,000,000 for a given period of time and repay the entire 
amount plus fifty-five percent of any profit Bakke earns at the end of 
that period. After Bakke returns the $1,000,000, Adrian controls all 
aspects of the property. Bakke’s use of the money throughout the du-
ration of the arrangement is irrelevant. Adrian bears the unitary re-
sidual risk of the $1,000,000, and the arrangement would be a loan.157
 Arrangements with unitary risk are fairly simple, but they may 
present opportunities for parties to exploit appropriable quasi-
rents.158 For example, if the demand for Bakke’s services increases 
while he is under contract to provide services with respect to Adrian’s 
property, Bakke may demand a greater share of the profits. Alterna-
tively, if Adrian realizes that Bakke’s situation prevents him from 
changing employment, Adrian may require more from him.159 Eco-
nomic theory suggests that parties in unitary-risk arrangements can 
help reduce appropriable quasi-rents by integrating their re-
sources.160 Parties may integrate their resources by contributing 
them to some sort of legal entity. For example, Adrian and Bakke 
                                                                                                                    
 155. This example is from Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 9 F.3d 
623, 624–25 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 156. Control during the duration of an existing agreement is, however, important in 
determining whether an arrangement is a hired-property or hired-services arrangement. 
See Borden, supra note 10, at 312–16. 
 157. Even though the residual-risk analysis determines the arrangement is a loan, the 
parties may prefer to classify it as something else to avoid usury laws. 
 158. An appropriable quasi-rent exists when an asset’s value exceeds its salvage value 
(i.e., “its value in its next best use to another renter”). Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford 
& Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Con-
tracting Process, 21 J L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).  
 159. For example, if the property is an apartment complex, Adrian may subdivide the 
units and require Bakke to manage more units for the same compensation. 
 160. See Borden, supra note 26, at 752–61; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 158, 
at 307. Parties also integrate resources to reduce transaction costs. See R. H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–91 (1937). To integrate their property and ser-
vices, Adrian and Bakke must believe that forfeiting unitary residual risk is a lower cost 
than the appropriable rents each party would have in a nonintegrated arrangement.  
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could integrate their property and services by contributing them to a 
limited liability company or corporation. After the parties integrate 
their resources, they will have to concern themselves with reducing 
agency costs.161 They can share residual risk in one of two ways to 
help reduce agency costs—allocation-dependent residual risk or dis-
tribution-dependent residual risk.  
B.   Allocation-Dependent Residual Risk 
 After integrating their resources, Adrian and Bakke may decide 
that the best way to reduce agency costs is to use an allocation for-
mula to determine each party’s residual risk. Such use of an alloca-
tion formula creates allocation-dependent residual risk. Allocation-
dependent residual risk is the quintessential residual risk that mem-
bers of partnerships bear. Partnership law provides that upon liqui-
dation of a partnership, each partner shall receive the amount con-
tributed to the partnership, plus any profit allocated to the partner, 
minus any distributions made to the partner.162 Professor Gary S. Ro-
sin describes two approaches courts use to determine the amount 
partners receive on liquidation—the unitary approach and the dua-
listic approach.163 Both approaches determine partners’ residual 
claims as a function of contributions, plus allocations, minus distri-
butions.164 Thus, residual risk in partnerships depends upon the  
allocation formula. 
                                                                                                                    
 161. See Borden supra note 10, at 309 (describing how parties may use allocations to 
reduce agency costs); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 309 (recognizing that even the 
most basic arrangements (such as co-authoring an article) create agency costs). 
 162. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401, 807(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 133, 206 (2001). 
 163. See Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functional-
ism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 446–65 (1989). 
 164. If partnership expenses exceed revenue, the partnership will have negative profits 
and the residual value of the partnership may be less than the amount of contributions. 
Decreases in the value of contributed assets may also cause the residual value of partner-
ship assets to be less than the amount contributed. Because members of partnerships are 
jointly and severally liable for partnership liabilities, see UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997), 
6 U.L.A. 117 (2001), a partnership could have negative residual value. If a partnership 
with negative residual value were to liquidate, the partners would be required to make ad-
ditional contributions to satisfy the claims of creditors. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807(b) 
(1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001). To avoid that potentiality, most business owners use a legal 
entity, such as a limited liability company, to obtain limited liability protection. Because 
the members of a limited liability company are not liable for the debts of the business, a 
limited liability company with negative residual value does not expose the members to lia-
bility. Similarly, members of a limited liability company may agree that rights on distribu-
tion shall equal their contributions, plus shares of profits, minus distributions. See UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(a) (1996), 6A U.L.A. 563 (2003). Otherwise, the default statute 
provides that the limited liability company will distribute residual assets in accordance 
with members’ interests in the company. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 806(b) (1996), 6A 
U.L.A. 626 (2003). From a residual risk standpoint, limited liability companies can be very 
similar to partnerships; so going forward, this Article refers to all legal arrangements that 
determine residual risk as a function of allocations as partnerships, unless stated other-
wise. State law gives all such partnerships allocation-dependent residual risk by default.  
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 Consider allocation-dependent residual risk as expressed in a hy-
pothetical partnership. Assume that Adrian and Bakke are partners 
and they agree to allocate fifty-five percent of the partnership profits 
to Adrian and forty-five percent to Bakke. They also agree to allocate 
any appreciation from the property thirty-five percent to Adrian and 
sixty-five percent to Bakke. They use these allocation formulae to re-
duce agency costs. More specifically, to help ensure that Adrian con-
tributes property with strong income-producing potential, Bakke  
insists that Adrian share significantly in the property’s income.  
To help encourage Bakke to fully perform services that improve  
the property’s value, Adrian agrees that Bakke will receive a signifi-
cant portion of any gain realized on the disposition of the property. 
Thus, Adrian and Bakke use the allocation rules to help reduce agen-
cy costs. Those allocations, in turn, largely determine the parties’ re-
sidual claims.165
 Tax law does not attempt to measure the residual risk of partners 
on an annual basis. Instead, it carries partnership assets at historic 
cost and uses historic cost to determine partners’ capital account  
balances.166 Partnership tax law uses capital accounts to gauge the 
validity of partnership tax item allocations.167 The partnership tax 
rules provide generally that partners’ capital accounts adjust only  
for allocations of partnership recognized tax items (e.g., gains on  
dispositions of partnership property).168 Under aggregate-plus taxa-
tion, partners report their share of partnership income only when  
the partnership recognizes income, even if the partnership does not 
make distributions.169
 Despite tax law’s delay in recognizing economic items or a part-
nership’s delay in making distributions, partners take an interest  
in partnership economic items as residual claimants. Upon liquida-
tion, they would have a right to such amount, and as partners, they 
exercise some control over the items’ use and disposition.170 Those 
                                                                                                                    
 165. Table 2 of the Appendix illustrates the parties’ residual claims over a ten-year period. 
 166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 2006) (requiring partners to 
adjust their capital accounts for the fair market value of contributed property but adjust-
ing capital accounts thereafter only for realized items). 
 167. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (as amended in 2006) (providing that for an 
allocation to have economic effect under the economic effect safe harbor, the partnership 
agreement must provide for distributions to be made in accordance with positive capital 
account balances). But see Borden, supra note 10, at 334–38 (arguing that capital accounts 
are tax-centric and imperfectly measure the economic aspects of a partnership). 
 168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 2006). An exception to this 
rule is adjustments to the book value of assets on the occurrence of certain events, such as 
liquidating distributions or the admission of a new partner. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (as amended in 2006). 
 169. See generally I.R.C. § 702(c) (2006). 
 170. See, e.g., Fishback v. United States, 215 F.Supp. 621, 626 (D.S.D. 1963) (finding 
that parties were joint proprietors and holding that the arrangement was a tax partner-
ship); Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964) (considering whether the parties 
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rights help explain the parties’ economic interests in an arrange-
ment. Tax law should recognize partners’ interests in the economic 
performance of partnerships as expressed in their residual claims 
and tax them accordingly. 
C.   Distribution-Dependent Residual Risk 
 Adrian and Bakke may decide that they can best reduce agency 
costs by using distribution-dependent residual risk. They can obtain 
that objective using a corporation under state law. Assume the corpo-
ration issues two classes of stock—cumulative preferred and common 
stock. The cumulative preferred stock provides the holder with a cu-
mulative eight percent annual dividend and a return-of-capital prefe-
rence on dissolution of the corporation. The common stock provides 
one vote for each share and a right to distributions upon liquidation 
in proportion to shares held. Adrian contributes $1,000,000 to the 
corporation for 1,000 shares of preferred stock. The corporation is-
sues fifty shares of common stock to each of Adrian and Bakke in ex-
change for services they will perform.171 In this hypothetical corpora-
tion, each shareholder’s residual claim depends on the manner in 
which the corporation distributes the residual assets as determined 
by the shareholders’ stock ownership.  
 Consider why Adrian and Bakke might use distribution-
dependant residual risk instead of allocation-dependant residual 
risk. For example, Adrian may wish to align Bakke’s economic inter-
ests generally with her own economic interests. She may believe the 
best way to align their interests is to provide Bakke a general inter-
est in the sum of the business’s performance and the property’s ap-
preciation. Adrian’s opportunity cost of investing in the business may 
require Bakke to agree to an eight percent preferred coupon for 
Adrian’s contribution. Adrian’s sharing in the profit as a holder of 
common stock will encourage her to use her capital allocation exper-
tise to help maximize corporate performance. The shareholders’ resi-
dual claims depend on the overall performance of the business. 
 State law imposes distribution-dependent residual risk on corpo-
rations, and shareholders cannot contract out of it. Corporate law 
provides that upon dissolution, a corporation disposes of its assets, 
                                                                                                                    
shared control and responsibilities of the enterprise in holding that no partnership ex-
isted); Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 840, 852–53 (1957) (finding that the 
parties had mutual proprietary interest in profits and holding that the arrangement was a 
tax partnership).
 171. Upon receipt of the shares of stock, Adrian and Bakke must include in their re-
spective gross incomes the fair market value of the shares received. See I.R.C. § 83(a) 
(2006). The hypothetical assumes the value of the stock is nominal, so the income tax effect 
to Adrian and Bakke would not be significant. Table 3 of the Appendix summarizes the 
parties’ residual claims.  
276 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:245 
discharges its liabilities, and distributes the remaining property to 
its shareholders according to their interests.172 Shareholders’ inter-
ests derive from the type of stock they own in relation to the type of 
stock owned by other shareholders. Corporate law requires corpora-
tions to issue at least one class of stock,173 ensuring that at least one 
class of shareholders “share in the ultimate residual interest in the 
corporation.”174 Corporations may issue multiple classes of stock,175
which complicates the computation of shareholders’ residual claims 
but does not change its focus.176 Upon liquidation, the corporation 
would first distribute Adrian’s return on the preferred stock, then 
distribute Adrian’s contributions for preferred stock, and finally di-
vide any remaining assets according to common stock ownership.  
 Under the current classification model, the corporation would be a 
tax corporation subject to entity taxation.177 Adrian and Bakke may 
prefer the economic benefits of an arrangement with distribution-
dependent residual risk but want to be subject to aggregate-plus tax-
ation. The primacy of contract in noncorporate legal entities allows 
members of noncorporations to create distribution-dependent resi-
dual risk. One increasingly popular technique for creating contrac-
tual distribution-dependent residual risk is partnership target alloca-
tions.178 Such arrangements would be tax partnerships under the 
current classification model.179
 Target allocations include two components: (1) a tiered distribu-
tion structure, and (2) a distribution-dependent allocation provi-
                                                                                                                    
 172. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.05(a) (1984) (amended 2007). 
 173. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b)(1) (1984) (amended 2007). 
 174. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) cmt. 2 at 6-5 (1984) (amended 2007). 
 175. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.01(c)(3)-(4) (1984) (amended 2007) (allowing articles of 
incorporation to authorize one or more classes or series of stock that “entitle the holders to dis-
tributions calculated in any manner, including dividends that may be cumulative, noncumula-
tive, or partially cumulative; or . . . have preference over any other class or series of shares with 
respect to distributions, including distributions upon the dissolution of the corporation”). 
 176. The various classes of stock may carry different voting rights or distribution prefe-
rences. See id. Only the distribution preferences would affect shareholders’ residual claims. A 
shareholder’s residual claim is merely the residual value of the corporation (i.e., the amount left 
after satisfying nonshareholder liability) multiplied by the shareholder’s interest in the corpora-
tion. If a corporation has a single class of stock, a shareholder’s interest will merely be the num-
ber of shares the shareholder owns divided by the total outstanding shares. If the corporation 
has multiple classes of stock with different distribution preferences, a shareholder’s interest in 
the corporation must account for the different preferences. Table 3, infra, illustrates how differ-
ent distribution preferences affect a shareholder’s interest in a corporation. 
 177. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2008) (defining tax corporation to in-
clude state-law corporations). 
 178. Other types of arrangements in partnership agreements may create distribution-
dependent residual risk. This Article’s use of target allocations as an example of the potential 
for creating distribution-dependent residual risk is illustrative of such potential and does not 
deem one method to be more or less worthy of the task than another. 
 179. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). 
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sion.180 The tiered distribution structure describes how the arrange-
ment will distribute property to its members and therefore describes 
the parties’ economic arrangement. A simple tiered distribution 
structure of a target allocation could have three tiers. Tier One could 
provide that to the extent an arrangement has sufficient residual as-
sets, it will first distribute them to property contributors as a fixed 
return on contributions.181 Tier Two could require the partnership to 
distribute property as a return of contributions, to the extent possi-
ble.182 Finally, if property remains after Tier One and Tier Two dis-
tributions, Tier Three could require the arrangement to distribute its 
property to the owners in proportion to their ownership interests.183
 An example illustrates the distribution structure of target alloca-
tions. Assume Adrian and Bakke form a limited liability company. 
Adrian agrees to contribute $1,000,000, and Adrian and Bakke both 
agree to provide services with respect to the property. The parties in-
clude target allocations in the company’s operating agreement. Tier 
One will, to the extent the company has sufficient assets, distribute a 
cumulative simple eight percent return on capital to members who 
contribute property to the company. To the extent any property re-
mains after the Tier One distribution, Tier Two will return capital 
contributions. Tier Three will distribute any remaining company 
property between the members equally.184
 Notice that Adrian’s and Bakke’s residual claims in a partnership 
with target allocations are identical to the residual claims they would 
have as corporate shareholders.185 Upon liquidation, the company 
would first distribute an eight percent return to Adrian under Tier 
One, then it would return Adrian’s contribution under Tier Two, and 
finally, under Tier Three, it would distribute remaining assets equal-
ly to Adrian and Bakke. This simple example illustrates that mem-
bers of noncorporate entities may use target allocations to create 
economic rights that mirror shareholders’ economic rights. The tiered 
distribution structure of a target allocation provision is a non-tax 
agreement among the parties. They use the tiered structure to obtain 
distribution-dependent residual risk for the same reasons sharehold-
ers structure distribution-dependent residual risk.186
                                                                                                                    
 180. Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations—Idiot-Proof or Drafting for 
Idiots?, 35 REAL EST. TAX’N 116, 124 (2008).  
 181. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations—Drafting in Wonder-
land, 35 REAL EST. TAX’N. 162, 163 (2008). 
 182. See id.
 183. See id.
 184. Table 4 of the Appendix summarizes the parties’ residual claim in a partnership 
with target allocations. 
 185. Compare Table 3 with Table 4 of the Appendix.  
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 177–178 (discussing reasons why parties may 
use arrangements with distribution-dependent residual risk). 
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 Having decided upon the economic arrangement, the parties simply 
provide that tax items must be allocated to partners in such a manner 
that capital accounts will equal the amount to be distributed to the 
partners.187 Such an allocation formula for tax items makes the alloca-
tion a function of the residual claims. The allocations become a plug 
figure needed to match capital accounts with distribution amounts.188
Such allocations create difficulty and questions for tax law.  
 Compare taxation allocations in partnerships with target alloca-
tions to allocations in traditional partnerships. Tax-item allocations 
in traditional partnerships are independent of residual claims, de-
termined by the partners’ agreement or state law. The partners agree 
how they will allocate the economic items, and each partner’s total al-
locations equal the sum of the individually allocated items. The allo-
cations then determine each partner’s residual claim.189
 On the other hand, tax items allocated in a partnership with target 
allocations are a function of the partners’ residual claims. The alloca-
tions fill in capital accounts to ensure capital account balances reflect 
distribution rights.190 Thus, allocations in a partnership with target al-
locations depend on the partnership’s distributions. The allocations do 
not affect the partners’ residual claims. Instead, the distribution for-
mula determines partners’ residual claims. Thus, the economics of tra-
ditional partnerships and partnerships with target allocations are 
fundamentally different, yet the two arrangements are subject to the 
same tax regime. The economics of a partnership with target alloca-
tions are similar to the economics of a corporation, yet those two ar-
rangements are subject to different tax regimes. This Article argues 
that tax law should recognize the fundamental economic aspects of ar-
rangements to determine the applicable tax regime.191
D.   Allocation-Distribution Symmetry 
 The prior sections described the difference between allocation-
dependent residual risk and distribution-dependent residual risk. In 
a stochastic economy, sophisticated allocation-dependent residual 
risk formulae produce a residual risk that a distribution-dependent 
residual risk formula cannot duplicate. For example, a distribution-
dependent residual risk could not mirror the residual claims of the 
parties of the traditional partnership.192 Perhaps a distribution-
dependent formula could match residual claims in Year 1, but it 
                                                                                                                    
 187. See Cuff, supra note 181, at 163. 
 188. See id. at 165 (providing that tax allocations follow modified book income that the 
partnership allocates to the partners). 
 189. See Table 2 of the Appendix. 
 190. See Cuff, supra note 180, at 124. 
 191. See infra Section IV. 
 192. Compare Tables 3 and 4 with Table 2 of the Appendix. 
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could not maintain the duplication consistently in subsequent 
years.193 The nonuniform fluctuations of profits and property value 
make mirroring the residual claims ex ante impossible. That inability 
further illustrates the economic differences of arrangements with the 
different types of residual risk. If the allocation or distribution formu-
lae are complex, they will not have symmetry in a stochastic market. 
 The allocation and distribution structures may, however, have 
symmetry if an arrangement is simple. For example, a corporation 
with a single class of stock must distribute the residual assets to the 
shareholders in proportion to the shares of outstanding stock each 
shareholder owns.194 Adrian and Bakke may decide to form a corpora-
tion with one class of stock. Economic considerations would undoub-
tedly motivate that decision. For example, assume Adrian contri-
butes the property to a corporation and causes the corporation to 
grant Bakke twenty shares of common stock and the remaining eigh-
ty shares to Adrian.195 Adrian’s and Bakke’s residual claims are sim-
ple to compute; they are the value of the residual assets of the corpo-
ration multiplied by the proportion of shares each person holds.196
Each year, Adrian’s and Bakke’s residual claims are respectively 
eighty percent and twenty percent of the corporation’s residual value. 
 Assume alternatively that Adrian and Bakke form a limited liabil-
ity company to take advantage of the management flexibility such an 
entity offers. The same economic factors motivate their decision to 
form the company. Adrian contributes $1,000,000 of property and 
Bakke contributes services to the new company. Adrian and Bakke 
take eighty- and twenty-percent interests in the company, respective-
ly.197 Adrian and Bakke do not include an allocation provision in the 
company’s operating agreement, so state law dictates that the com-
                                                                                                                    
 193. For example, the ratio of Adrian’s residual claim to Bakke’s residual claim in Year 
1 of Table 2 of the Appendix is approximately 1,000 to 57. A corporation could match that 
ratio in Year 1 by issuing common stock to its members in that ratio. In Year 2, the ratio of 
partners’ residual claims is 1,200 to 200. That differs from Year 1’s residual claims, and it 
would differ from the residual claims based upon stock ownership that matched the Year 1 
residual claims. The differences would continue in subsequent years. 
 194. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(b) (1984) (amended 2007).  
 195. The grant of the shares to Bakke should be a taxable event to Bakke. See I.R.C. § 
83(a) (2006). The corporation should get a deduction equal to the amount of income that 
Bakke recognizes, assuming the corporation does not have to capitalize the expenditure. 
See I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006). If the corporation were to liquidate immediately, Bakke would re-
ceive $200,000. That should roughly equal the amount of income he should recognize upon 
joining the corporation, adjusted as appropriate to reflect a minority discount. 
 196. Table 5 of the Appendix summarizes the parties’ claims. 
 197. The formation includes a capital shift. Because Bakke becomes a twenty percent 
member of the company, he should receive twenty percent of the value of any liquidating 
distribution. Consequently, the formation of this company includes a capital shift, so 
Bakke will recognize gain on the formation equal to the value of the interest he receives. 
See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2006); MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 120, at ¶ 5.07. The 
partnership should also get a deduction equal to the amount of income that Bakke recog-
nizes, assuming it is not required to capitalize the amount. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006).  
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pany will allocate eighty percent of profits and losses, including gains 
and losses from the sale of the property, to Adrian and the other 
twenty percent to Bakke.198
 Notice that the distribution-dependent residual claims of a corpora-
tion with a single class of stock can be identical to the allocation-
dependent residual claims of a limited liability company using a sim-
ple allocation formula.199 When the capital structure of a corporation 
and the allocation method of a partnership are simple, such allocation-
distribution symmetry is possible. Because the same outcome results 
with both types of residual risk, economic factors do not appear to dic-
tate the parties’ choice of entity. Disregarding tax considerations, other 
factors such as management flexibility, ease of formation, or familiari-
ty with a particular legal entity would influence the decision.200
 Certain principles emerge from the study of residual risk and busi-
ness law. First, entity forms emerged to satisfy the business needs of 
increasingly complex economies and business practices. In particular, 
the law evolved to provide entity shielding, limited liability, continuity 
of existence, and centralized management. Second, tax law adopted le-
gal forms and labels to classify business arrangements but did not jus-
tify such adoption. Third, legal forms and labels create arbitrary dis-
tinctions between the different tax entities and violate horizontal equi-
ty by classifying economically equivalent arrangements differently and 
economically different arrangements similarly. That tax treatment al-
lows well-informed taxpayers to gain a tax advantage over others.201
Fifth, residual risk measures the economic interests parties have in 
business arrangements. Residual risk leads to a policy-justified model 
for classifying business arrangements for tax purposes.  
IV.   RESIDUAL-RISK CLASSIFICATION MODEL
 Accurate placement of the incidence of taxation is the standard 
that governs the model’s residual-risk construction. The analysis  
begins by considering basic tax situations and progresses to more 
complicated arrangements. The analysis demonstrates that natural 
law principles support the basic forms of aggregate taxation, aggre-
gate-plus taxation, and entity taxation, depending on an arrange-
ment’s type of residual risk, and provides a framework for the new 
classification model. 
                                                                                                                    
 198. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. Act § 405(a) (1996), 6A U.L.A. 593 (2003). Table 6 of the 
Appendix summarizes the parties’ claims. 
 199. See residual claims in Tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix. 
 200. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 210 (2004) 
(“[P]artnership-type firms offer an agreement-centered approach to centralized manage-
ment that provides flexibility and adaptability.”). 
 201. See Brooks, supra note 109, at 1674–76. 
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 All economic situations require complex decisionmaking,202 but 
some may present relatively straightforward tax problems. For ex-
ample, an employment arrangement presents relatively unsophisti-
cated tax problems. Assume Adrian and Bakke are neighbors. After a 
heavy snowstorm, Adrian offers to pay Bakke fifty dollars to shovel 
her sidewalks. Bakke’s receipt of the fifty dollars represents income 
from services, which is subject to income tax.203 Bakke recognizes  
and reports income upon receipt of the payment.204 Bakke’s shoveling 
the snow and receiving payment represents a simple services ar-
rangement. Bakke owned only services, so he easily traces the in-
come from his services, recognizes that income, and bears the tax 
burden of that income.205
 Wholly-owned property also presents simple tax scenarios. As-
sume now that Adrian owns $1,000,000 of real property. She receives 
$50,000 of rent. Her receipt of the rent is income to her.206 If she later 
sells the land, any gain she recognizes on the sale should also be in-
come to her.207 This simple arrangement represents two important 
aspects of all wholly-owned property arrangements. First, the owner 
may receive income from the property (rent in this situation). Second, 
the owner may receive income from gains recognized on the sale of 
property.208 The owner can trace either type of income directly from 
the property, is required to recognize that income, and must bear the 
tax burden of that income. 
                                                                                                                    
 202. See Hart & Moore, supra note 154, at 1121–25 (considering the economic factors 
that go into the decision whether to hire services or provide services oneself); supra text 
accompanying note 165 (describing plausible economic decisionmaking). 
 203. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006). Bakke may offset that income with any allowed de-
ductions. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (2006). To keep the analysis simple and focused on the primary 
issues, this Article assumes that the income items in this Section are more than offsetting 
deductions allowed to the respective parties. 
 204. The U.S. tax system defines gross income broadly to include any “accessions to 
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the [person] ha[s] complete dominion.” Comm’r v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Bakke’s performance of services and receipt 
of payment for services satisfies that definition of gross income. If a person is an accrual 
method taxpayer, realization may occur at a time other than receipt. See I.R.C. § 451(a) 
(2006). To keep the analysis simple, this discussion assumes all parties use the cash me-
thod of accounting. 
 205. Assuming the sidewalks were on Adrian’s personal residence, Adrian should have no 
deduction because tax law prohibits deductions for personal expenses. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006). 
 206. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2006). 
 207. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006). 
 208. Id. Several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code allow for nonrecognition on 
certain dispositions of property. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006) (providing persons making 
qualifying property contributions to corporations in exchange for stock in the corporation 
do not recognize gain or loss on the contributions); I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2006) (providing 
that property owners do not recognize gain or loss on the exchange of like property held for 
productive use in a trade or business or for investment); I.R.C. § 1033(a) (2006) (providing 
that property owners who use proceeds from involuntarily converted property to acquire 
other qualifying property shall not recognize gain or loss on the involuntary conversion). 
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 These simple services and property ownership arrangements are 
examples of unitary residual risk. Bakke bore the residual risk of his 
service, and Adrian bore the residual risk of her property. The simplic-
ity of the arrangements makes identifying the source of the income 
straightforward. As sole bearer of the residual risk of his services, 
Bakke’s income derived only from those services, and as sole bearer of 
the residual risk of the real property, Adrian’s income derived only 
from the property.209 The income for the services and property easily 
traces to the respective risk bearer of each source of income.  
 This simple example demonstrates that if an arrangement has un-
itary risk, its parties can trace income from resources they own. Tax 
law can accurately match the burden of taxation to economic items if 
it can trace income from its source to the owner of the source. Tracing 
is possible in simple nonintegrated arrangements with unitary resi-
dual risk. However, tracing is not possible when parties integrate re-
sources. Integrated arrangements require aggregate-plus or entity 
taxation. 
A.   Case for Aggregate-Plus Taxation 
 Tracing income from its source becomes impossible when the par-
ties integrate services and property,210 which parties do by reciprocal-
ly transferring residual claims in the property and services. Thus, 
Adrian and Bakke could integrate their resources if Adrian assigned 
a portion of the residual claim in her property to Bakke and Bakke 
assigned a portion of the residual claim in his services to Adrian. If 
Adrian is unable to change the property’s use or dispose of it without 
Bakke’s consent, Adrian has transferred a portion of the residual 
claim to Bakke. Adrian retains a portion of the residual claim, how-
ever, because Bakke would be unable to unilaterally control the use 
and disposition of the property. Bakke transfers an interest in his 
services by giving Adrian a share of the service’s residual claim. 
Adrian may not be able to legally compel Bakke to provide services, 
but if Bakke were to provide similar services to another arrange-
ment, Adrian would have a claim against him for the economic dam-
ages resulting from providing such services.211
                                                                                                                    
 209. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940) (holding that the person who 
owned property owned the income from the property); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 
(1930) (holding income from services belongs to the services provider).  
 210. See Borden, supra note 118, at 953–55. 
 211. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, § 404(b)(3) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) (prohibiting partners 
from competing with the partnership); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.5, at 745 
(4th ed. 2004) (discussing rights of parties harmed in breached service contracts). 
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 Integration obfuscates the source of the income.212 Tracing income 
separately from integrated resources is impossible. In an integrated 
arrangement, income allocated to the parties flows from their inter-
ests in both the property and services. The parties generally will be 
unable to ascertain the portion of the income from the integrated ar-
rangement that derives from the respective resources. For example, if 
the arrangement has $100,000 of profit, that profit will derive from 
contributions of the property and services. The parties cannot, how-
ever, deconstruct the income to determine how much flows respec-
tively from the property and the services. The parties, therefore, can-
not trace income directly from its source to the owner of the source. 
That inability to trace requires some method for determining each 
party’s share of income from the integrated resources. 
 Aggregate-plus taxation uses allocation rules to address the ina-
bility to trace in integrated arrangements that have allocation-
dependent residual risk.213 Allocation rules should allow the burden 
of taxation to follow the allocation of economic items in such inte-
grated arrangements.214 The example above of the traditional part-
nership illustrates this point.215 Recall that the arrangement had 
$100,000 of profit in the first year.216 The agreement between Adrian 
and Bakke provided that the partnership would allocate $65,000 of 
that profit to Adrian and $35,000 to Bakke. The agreement, however, 
provided that the arrangement will not distribute the amounts to the 
parties for some time. Nonetheless, the allocated income items be-
come a part of the parties’ residual claims because the arrangement 
                                                                                                                    
 212. Thus, even if the profit-sharing ratio and the gain-sharing ratio of the noninte-
grated arrangement are identical to the ratios of the integrated arrangement, identifying 
the source of income in the integrated arrangement is not possible. Focusing on the contri-
buted item also fails to identify the source of income. See Borden, supra note 26, at 753. 
The essence of an integrated arrangement is the reciprocal ownership in all contributed 
items and a right to income from each. 
 213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2006) (providing extensive and 
complicated partnership allocation rules). 
 214. The current allocation rules allow tax to follow the economic items, but probably 
do not require them to follow the economics. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (2006) (requiring alloca-
tions to have substantial economic effect); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (as amended in 
2006) (requiring economic benefit or burden to follow tax item). The rules also allow for 
some gaming of the tax system. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338–44 (discussing the abili-
ty to use the current rules to internalize tax-item transactions). Lawmakers should modify 
the rules to ensure that the incidence of taxation always follows the allocation of the eco-
nomic items. This Article recommends an ideal tax entity classification model. Such a 
model would demand allocation rules that require the incidence of taxation to follow eco-
nomic items in a manner discussed in Borden, supra note 10, at 344–45. 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
 216. The arrangement could have all the characteristics of an entity without affecting 
this analysis. Therefore, the analysis assumes the arrangement is an entity that has in-
come and holds property.  
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adopted allocation-dependent residual risk.217 Thus, although they do 
not actually receive the allocated item, they should recognize it and 
report it when the arrangement recognizes it. Aggregate-plus taxa-
tion requires the parties to recognize the amount allocated to them 
on their respective tax returns.218 Aggregate-plus taxation, therefore, 
correctly addresses issues that arise in arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk. 
 Imposing an entity-level tax on an arrangement that adopts allo-
cation-dependent residual risk would generally result in inaccurate 
placement of the burden of taxation. Adrian and Bakke formed a 
partnership and agreed to allocate profits fifty-five percent to Adrian 
and forty-five percent to Bakke.219 If Adrian and Bakke are subject to 
different tax rates, an entity-level tax would have to accurately re-
flect their rates to properly place the burden of taxation. If the total 
tax imposed at the entity level does not equal the aggregate tax that 
the parties would pay under that regime, the entity tax would not be 
accurate.220 Furthermore, if the entity-level rate differed from either 
individual’s tax rate, the entity-level tax would inaccurately place the 
burden of taxation.221 Even though entity taxation should not apply 
to arrangements with allocation-dependent residual risk, the current 
classification model allows such arrangements to elect to be tax cor-
porations.222 Thus, the current model facilitates the inaccurate 
placement of the tax burden. 
 Integrating property and services not only makes tracing impossi-
ble, it also complicates tax accounting and reporting. Tax law must 
address the formation, operation, and dissolution of integrated ar-
                                                                                                                    
 217. See supra Section III.B. (discussing allocation-dependent residual risk). This 
clearly has allocation-dependent residual risk because the parties allocate specific items 
(i.e., income and gain) to each other, and each has a residual claim in the property and ser-
vices of the arrangement. Thus, on liquidation, they would receive the amount they contri-
buted plus allocations minus any distributions. 
 218. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 703 (2006). 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
 220. For example, assume the arrangement had $100,000 of income and that Adrian’s 
tax rate on her share of income would have been thirty percent and Bakke’s tax rate would 
have been twenty percent on his share of income. Adrian’s tax liability would have been 
$16,500 ($55,000 × 30%), and Bakke’s tax liability would have been $9,000 ($45,000 × 
20%). To place the correct incidence of taxation on this amount of income at the entity lev-
el, the entity-level rate would have to equal 25.5 percent ($25,000 total tax divided 
$100,000 total income). That rate would have to change each year that the arrangement 
had a different amount of income or the tax rate of one of the members changed. Addition-
ally, for the incidence of the entity tax to place properly, the parties would have to allocate 
the tax liability in such a way that Adrian bears $16,500 of the liability and Bakke bears 
$9,000. The allocation ration of those amounts (65%:35%) differs from the agreed to alloca-
tion of profits (55%:45%).  
 221. For example, if Adrian’s rate was thirty percent and the entity’s rate was twenty per-
cent, the entity level tax would reduce the incidence of taxation for items allocated to Adrian. 
 222. See Treas. Reg. §301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (allowing multiple member 
noncorporate arrangements to elect to be tax corporations). 
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rangements. For example, a tax system that uses a form of aggregate 
taxation for an arrangement’s operations should consider how to allo-
cate built-in gain or loss that exists at the time of formation.223 Ag-
gregate-plus taxation can allocate such built-in items to the proper-
ty’s contributor;224 an entity tax system cannot. To handle all tax as-
pects of integrated arrangements, tax law adds some entity compo-
nents to the aggregate system.225 For example, it requires tax part-
nerships to compute taxable income and recognizes that partners 
own interests in the partnership, not the partnership’s property.226
Tax law would err, however, if it applied entity tax to integrated ar-
rangements that adopt allocation-dependent residual risk. Tax law 
must recognize the parties’ allocation arrangement, which makes 
entity taxation untenable for arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk. Instead, aggregate-plus taxation should go-
vern arrangements with allocation-dependent residual risk. 
 Finally, an entity-level tax would provide opportunities for abuse. 
For example, the current entity-level tax regime provides that prop-
erty contributors do not recognize gain on the contribution of proper-
ty upon formation of an arrangement.227 The property contributors 
take a basis in membership interests equal to the basis they had in 
contributed property,228 and the entity takes the carryover basis of 
the property.229 The nonrecognition and basis rules provide an oppor-
tunity to shift tax burdens. To illustrate the potential abuse, assume 
both Adrian and Bakke contribute property to an arrangement sub-
ject to entity tax. Adrian has a built-in gain in her property and 
Bakke has a built-in loss in his property. If the parties sold the prop-
erties before contribution, Adrian would have recognized gain, and 
Bakke would have recognized loss. By contributing the properties to 
the arrangements, they share the loss and gain. Thus, Bakke’s built-
in loss offsets some, or all, of Adrian’s built-in gain and provides a tax 
                                                                                                                    
 223. Built-in gain is the excess of fair market value over the basis of property at the 
date of contribution. Treas. Reg. §1.704-3(a)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2005). Because built-in 
gain represents appreciation accrued prior to contribution, the person who contributes the 
property should pay tax on such gain when it is recognized. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006) (re-
quiring the contributing partner to recognize built-in gain); Jacob Rabkin & Mark H. John-
son, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws, 55 HARV. L. REV. 909, 915–20 (1942) 
(discussing the tax issues that arise when a partner contributes property to a partnership 
with built-in gain). 
 224. See I.R.C. §704(c) (2006). 
 225. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 703(a) (2006) (requiring partnerships to compute taxable  
income); I.R.C. § 706 (2006) (providing rules for determining a partnership’s taxable year); 
I.R.C. § 707 (2006) (providing rules to account for transactions between partners and  
partnerships); Borden, supra note 26, at 762-66 (describing the aggregate-plus theory of 
partnership taxation). 
 226. See I.R.C. §§ 703(a), 741 (2006). 
 227. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006). 
 228. See I.R.C. § 358(a) (2006).
 229. See I.R.C. § 362(a) (2006).
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benefit to Adrian.230 The transaction shifts the burden of taxation of 
Adrian’s built-in gain to Bakke. 
 Aggregate-plus taxation also helps ensure the proper taxation of 
changes in the value of property. Adrian and Bakke generally will 
not know the value of partnership property and cannot allocate ap-
preciation on an annual basis. Thus, they will only allocate shares of 
profit in a setting with imperfect information about changes in the 
property’s value. A partnership only allocates changes in the proper-
ty’s value when the partnership disposes of the property. Under the 
arrangement’s allocation formula, the total gain or loss allocated to 
each party in the year of disposition will be in the same ratio that 
annual gain or loss would have been allocated in a setting with per-
fect information. Therefore, the difference between the allocations in 
the two settings is a timing difference. Tax law recognizes those tim-
ing differences and provides different tax rates for gains on the dis-
positions of certain assets held for more than one year.231 Thus, ag-
gregate-plus taxation is well suited for arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk. 
B.   Case for Entity Taxation 
 Although entity taxation is not appropriate for arrangements with 
either unitary or allocation-dependent residual risk, it should apply 
to all arrangements with distribution-dependent residual risk. Ar-
rangements with distribution-dependent residual risk differ funda-
mentally from arrangements with either unitary residual risk or al-
location-dependent residual risk. Parties of arrangements with uni-
tary residual risk can trace economic items directly from property or 
services.232 Members of arrangements with allocation-dependent re-
sidual risk can trace economic items from the arrangement’s alloca-
tions.233 Members of arrangements that have distribution-dependent 
residual risk generally cannot trace economic items from their 
sources or from allocations because the members have integrated 
their resources.234 The following discussion demonstrates this con-
                                                                                                                    
 230. For example, if Adrian’s property had a $50,000 built-in gain and Bakke’s had a 
$50,000 built-in loss, Bakke’s built-in loss would offset Adrian’s built-in gain. The result is 
that instead of Adrian recognizing all $50,000 of the built-in gain she would have recog-
nized had she sold the property, she shifts half of that gain to Bakke. Adrian also obtains 
$25,000 of loss that Bakke would have recognized had they not both contributed property 
to the arrangement. Congress is aware of some of the potential abuses that entity taxation 
provides. It has recently enacted a provision to limit the amount of built-in loss recognized 
by entities in some situations. See I.R.C. § 362(d) (2006).
 231. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2006). See generally Nöel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. 
Schenk, The Case For a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993) (presenting 
some arguments for taxing gain from the sale of capital assets with favorable tax rates).  
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 206–209. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 213–230. 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 212–213. 
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cept. Thus, neither aggregate taxation nor aggregate-plus taxation 
will provide accurate tax treatment for arrangements with distribu-
tion-dependent residual risk.  
 Distribution-dependent residual risk determines residual claims 
by first computing the total residual value of an arrangement.235 It 
divides that residual value among the arrangement’s members ac-
cording to a formula based on stock ownership or an agreement 
among the members.236 The distribution formula indiscriminately 
combines all of the arrangement’s economic items to compute resi-
dual value. The indiscriminate combining of all of the arrangement’s 
economic items cleanses the items of their unique identities and 
groups them into a generic pool of residual assets. Thus, the profits 
and appreciation in the example all become part of the residual as-
sets of the arrangement, and their independent attributes become ir-
relevant for economic purposes to Adrian and Bakke. That cleansing 
makes tracing income from allocations impossible.  
   Recall that in one of the scenarios above, Adrian and Bakke 
formed a corporation that granted Adrian preferred stock and both 
Adrian and Bakke common stock.237 The corporation had profits and 
the value of its property fluctuated over time.238 If the corporation 
were to dissolve and liquidate, it would determine the residual value 
of its assets and distribute the residual assets to Adrian and Bakke 
according to their respective interests in the corporation. The resi-
dual assets would be a combination of contributed property, accumu-
lated profits, and the change in value of the property. The corpora-
tion would distribute the residual assets to Adrian and Bakke accord-
ing to the shares of stock they each owned. Adrian’s and Bakke’s use 
of distribution-dependent residual risk indicates that they did not 
wish to use specific economic items of the arrangement to reduce 
agency costs. Instead, they used general distribution ordering to re-
duce agency costs.239 In other words, they did not specifically use prof-
its or appreciation to control agency costs. Their interests were global 
and included the overall performance of the arrangement. Tax law 
should comprehend that distinction.  
 Aggregate and aggregate-plus taxation fail such arrangements. 
Assume that tax law has perfect information about tax profits and 
increases in property value. Assume further that tax law taxes prof-
its and gains at different rates and imposes limits on loss deduc-
                                                                                                                    
 235. See supra text accompanying note 172. 
 236. See id.
 237. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 238. See Table 1 of the Appendix. 
 239. See supra text following note 171 (discussing possible reasons why Adrian and 
Bakke might use distribution-dependent residual risk). 
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tions.240 That being the case, the amount of each item allocated to 
Adrian and Bakke could affect each party’s tax liability.241 By work-
ing backward from the computation of the corporation’s residual val-
ue, the parties determine the total amount to allocate to Adrian and 
Bakke.242 They cannot, however, determine the composition of the al-
locations. For example, they cannot determine the parties’ respective 
shares of profits and appreciation. 
 Consider the possible discrepancies that could result from apply-
ing aggregate-plus taxation to an arrangement with distribution-
dependant residual risk. The analysis will first examine such an ar-
rangement in a setting with perfect information. Then it will consider 
the same arrangement in a setting without perfect information. As-
sume that in Year 3 the corporation has $102,000 of profits and a 
$72,000 decrease in the value of the property.243 The sum of those 
numbers equals a $30,000 increase in residual value for that year. 
Aggregate-plus taxation would require the arrangement to allocate 
profits and increases in the property’s value to the members. Based 
on the parties’ distribution rights, the arrangement should allocate 
$55,000 to Adrian and $25,000 to Bakke.244 The distribution formula 
does not, however, determine how much profit and appreciation the 
arrangement should allocate to the parties. Therein lies the trouble. 
 The arrangement must allocate $55,000 to Adrian using any poss-
ible combination of $102,000 of profits and $72,000 decrease in prop-
erty value. It could do this by using anywhere from $55,000 to 
$102,000 of profits.245 At the low end of that range, the ratio of profit 
allocation to Adrian and Bakke would be fifty-five to forty-seven (or 
fairly close to one to one); at the high end of that range, the ratio 
                                                                                                                    
 240. Tax law has different tax rates for long-term gains on disposition of capital assets. 
See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2006). Tax law currently limits capital loss deductions to the amount of 
capital gains plus an additional amount. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2006).  
 241. For example, if Bakke pays a lower rate of tax on profits and capital gain is taxed 
at favorable rates, Adrian and Bakke could reduce their overall tax liability by allocating a 
larger share of profit to Bakke in exchange for a larger share of gain allocated to Adrian. 
Although Bakke may require some consideration to participate in such an allocation, 
Adrian would be willing to make the allocation in exchange for consideration. See Borden, 
supra note 10, at 322–23, 329–32 (describing such tax-item transactions). 
 242. For example, if Bakke’s share of the residual value of the assets increases from 
Year 2 to Year 3 by $51,000, the arrangement may assume that Bakke’s share of the total 
economic items for Year 3 was $51,000. 
 243. The discussion uses figures provided in Table 1 of the Appendix and rounds the 
numbers to the nearest thousand for aesthetic purposes. 
 244. See Table 4 of the Appendix. 
 245. If the arrangement were to allocate only $55,000 of profits to Adrian, it would al-
locate the remaining $47,000 of profits and all $72,000 of the decrease in value to Bakke. If 
it were to allocate all $102,000 of profits to Adrian, it would also allocate $47,000 of the de-
crease in value to Adrian and the remaining $25,000 of the decrease in value to Bakke. 
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would be one to zero.246 Some amount of the property’s decrease in 
value would make up the difference between Adrian’s total allocation 
and Adrian’s share of the profits.247 As Adrian’s allocated share of the 
profits slides along the range of possibilities, her share of decrease in 
value would slide along its own range of possibilities from $0 to 
$47,000. Thus, at the low end of that range, the ratio of increase in 
value allocated to Adrian and Bakke would be zero to one; at the high 
end of the range, the ratio would be forty-seven to twenty-five.248
That is a significant difference and could reflect significant tax con-
sequences for each party. 
 If the parties are in different tax brackets, the allocations could affect 
the tax liability of either party, and the ratios in which the arrangement 
allocates the tax items could affect the placement of the incidence of 
taxation.249 Aggregate-plus taxation applied to arrangements with dis-
tribution-dependent residual risk would provide taxpayers the opportu-
nity to play games by allocating items to achieve the most favorable tax 
results.250 For example, Adrian and Bakke may allocate more profits to 
Adrian because Adrian is in a lower tax bracket.251
 The lack of specific direction in the parties’ agreement further re-
veals the inappropriateness of aggregate-plus taxation for arrange-
ments with distribution-dependent residual risk. Recall that the par-
ties’ concern when forming the arrangement was not the allocation of 
specific items but general interests in the overall performance of the 
arrangement.252 Tax law should recognize the parties’ focus and place 
the burden of taxation at the entity level. Entity-level tax will not 
place the burden of taxation with perfect accuracy, but it should 
place it more accurately than aggregate-plus taxation and help elim-
inate tax gamesmanship. Additionally, an entity-level tax will affect 
                                                                                                                    
 246. At the low end of the range, the arrangement would allocate $51,000 of profits to 
each of Adrian and Bakke. At the high end of the range, the arrangement would allocate 
all profit to Adrian and none to Bakke. 
 247. For example, if Adrian’s share of profits were $55,000, his share of the decrease in 
value would have to be $0 to ensure that his total allocation came to $55,000. 
 248. If the arrangement allocates only $55,000 of profits to Adrian, it will allocate no de-
crease in value to Adrian. If it allocates all $102,000 of profits to Adrian, it will allocate $47,000 
of decrease in value to Adrian and the remaining $25,000 of decrease in value to Bakke. 
 249. See supra note 241 (discussing the possible effect different ratios of allocation 
could have on tax liability). 
 250. The current rules allow this to some extent, even in arrangements with allocation-
dependent residual risk. See Borden, supra note 10, at 338–44. The opportunities would be more 
pronounced because the arrangement would have economic items to help satisfy the test for 
economic effect. The only hurdle left to overcome would be the anemic test for substantiality.  
 251. The allocation would have to satisfy substantial economic effect, but that test is 
confusing and the IRS may have a difficult time challenging the allocations. See I.R.C. § 
704(b)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2008) (defining substantial-
ity to include the present value of the after-tax consequences of a distribution, which may 
be impossible to determine).  
 252. See supra text following note 171. 
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the overall economic performance of the entity, recognizing the par-
ties’ interest in the arrangement’s overall performance. 
 The problems of using aggregate-plus taxation can be exacerbated 
if an arrangement with distribution-dependent residual risk carries 
property at historic cost. Such arrangements must make allocations 
without taking into account changes in the property’s value. With on-
ly profit to allocate, the amount of profit allocated to each of Adrian 
and Bakke depends upon the distribution formula. In Year 3 for ex-
ample, the amount of profit allocated to Adrian would be $91,000, 
and the amount allocated to Bakke would be $11,000 (a ratio of 
roughly ninety to ten).253 The amounts allocated fall within the range 
of possible allocations made with perfect information, but they do not 
consider the amount of gain or loss, which is needed to determine  
residual claims.254
 The lack of information could have a cumulative effect as the ar-
rangement allocates profits over the years with no notion of the prop-
erty’s changing value. Over a number of years, an arrangement may 
allocate a disproportionately large amount of profit to one of the par-
ties compared to what it would have allocated with perfect informa-
tion. Ultimately, gain or loss recognized on the property’s disposition 
should equalize the total allocations. For example, if the arrangement 
had allocated a disproportionately large amount of profits to Adrian, 
the arrangement would allocate less gain to Adrian upon disposition of 
the property. Such equalizing allocation could, however, have a cha-
racter that differs from the allocations in prior years. Thus, long-term 
capital gain may offset earlier allocations of profit that were taxed at 
ordinary rates. Offsetting ordinary income with long-term capital gain 
creates a character shift over the life of the arrangement if profits allo-
cated to Adrian are later offset with a smaller allocation of long-term 
capital gain. Thus, Adrian would have paid tax at a higher rate over-
all. That difference reflects more than a timing difference that occurs 
in both aggregate and aggregate-plus taxation.255
 This analysis reveals that members of arrangements with distri-
bution-dependent residual risk cannot trace economic items from the 
source to the owner of the source. The members are also unable to 
trace economic items from allocations. Aggregate or aggregate-plus 
taxation would inaccurately place the incidence of taxation in ar-
rangements with distribution-dependent residual risk. Not taxing 
such arrangements would allow the members to defer taxation inde-
finitely.256 The inability to trace income from the source or from allo-
                                                                                                                    
 253. See Table 7 of the Appendix. 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 240–248. 
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 249–252. 
 256. See Brooks, supra note 90, at 638–43. 
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cations suggests that entity taxation should apply to arrangements 
with distribution-dependent residual risk. 
C.   Classifying Arrangements Under the Residual-Risk Model 
 The analysis of arrangements with unitary residual risk, allocation-
dependent residual risk, and distribution-dependent residual risk pro-
vides a framework for recommending the residual-risk model for clas-
sifying business arrangements. The model retains the three basic 
types of tax arrangements—disregarded arrangements, tax partner-
ships, and tax corporations—but divides them based on the type of re-
sidual risk. The new model eliminates qualified tax partnerships be-
cause they lack policy and theoretical support.257 That leaves one im-
portant tax regime—entity-minus taxation—unassigned. Entity-minus 
taxation currently applies to S corporations.258 Entity-minus taxation 
allows corporations with one class of stock and subject to certain stock 
ownership restrictions to flow corporate income through to the share-
holders.259 That flow-through helps simple arrangements avoid the 
entity and double taxation that the current regime generally imposes 
on tax corporations.260 The residual-risk model retains entity-minus 
taxation and applies it to electing simple closely-held arrangements (as 
defined in subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code) 261 with alloca-
tion-distribution symmetry.  
 Consider the arrangements described above that have allocation-
distribution symmetry.262 The corporation issued eighty shares of 
common stock to Adrian and the remaining twenty authorized shares 
of common stock to Bakke. Upon liquidation, the corporation will dis-
tribute eighty percent of the residual assets to Adrian and the re-
maining twenty percent to Bakke. If Adrian and Bakke formed the 
arrangement as a partnership and agreed to allocate all economic 
items eighty percent to Adrian and twenty percent to Bakke, the re-
sult upon liquidation would be the same.263
                                                                                                                    
 257. The policy justification for qualified tax partnerships is extremely tenuous under 
the current classification model. See Borden, supra note 35, at 347–59 (describing the in-
adequacies of aggregate-plus taxation as applied to qualified tax partnerships). Qualified 
tax partnerships are not supported under the residual-risk model, so this Article recom-
mends eliminating them. 
 258. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31. 
 259. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2006) (restricting stock ownership); I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2006) 
(providing that S corporations are not subject to tax); I.R.C. § 1366(a) (2006) (requiring S 
corporation shareholders to recognize their pro rata shares of S corporation tax items). 
 260. See Arthur B. Willis, Subchapter S: A Lure to Incorporate Proprietorships and 
Partnerships, 6 UCLA L. REV. 505, 509–11 (1959) (describing the benefits of Subchapter S).  
 261. See I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006) (defining small business corporations that are subject 
to subchapter S). 
 262. See supra Section III.D. 
 263. Compare Table 5 with Table 6 of the Appendix. 
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 Entity-minus taxation is a good tax regime for arrangements with 
allocation-distribution symmetry because it allows tax items to flow 
through to the members but does not impose the complexities of ag-
gregate-plus taxation.264 The trade off for the simplicity of entity-
minus taxation is that arrangements using entity-minus taxation 
must remain simple. Aggregate-plus taxation recognizes the concept 
of built-in gain or loss on the contribution of property and ensures 
that the contributor retains the incidence of tax related to such built-
in item.265 Entity-minus taxation, in its simplicity, does not have sim-
ilar provisions. The entity-minus approach is, therefore, less accurate 
than aggregate-plus taxation, but it trades accuracy for justified sim-
plicity. The restrictions on ownership limit the number of investors 
who will join an entity-minus arrangement and limit the transfer of 
ownership interests in such arrangements.266 Those limits help re-
duce the occurrence and magnitude of built-in gain and loss.267 Thus, 
only simple arrangements with ownership restrictions should qualify 
for entity-minus taxation.   
 The law should not, however, prohibit arrangements with alloca-
tion-distribution symmetry from using aggregate-plus taxation. Ag-
gregate-plus taxation is the most accurate entity tax regime because 
it accounts for built-in gain and loss.268 It also has more aggregate 
components than entity-minus taxation; for instance, aggregate-plus 
taxation recognizes the nature of the arrangement’s assets and ad-
justs their bases on disposition of an interest in the arrangement.269
Because aggregate-plus taxation enhances accuracy, tax law should 
not prohibit arrangements with allocation-distribution symmetry 
from using it.  
 Figure 2 depicts the residual-risk model. The first dividing line be-
tween disregarded arrangements and tax partnerships is allocation-
                                                                                                                    
 264. See Borden, supra note 26, at 723 (describing the need for some of the complexi-
ties of aggregate-plus taxation). 
 265. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006). 
 266. For example, subchapter S generally limits stock ownership to no more than 75 
U.S. resident individuals and allows the corporation to issue only one class of stock. See
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2006). Thus, many potential shareholders, such as trusts, partnerships, 
and non-U.S. residents, will be unable to invest in such arrangements.  
 267. The restrictions also reduce the occurrence of reverse built-in gain and loss. Re-
verse built-in gain and loss arise when a new member joins an existing arrangement that 
has assets with value that differs from their tax bases. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (as 
amended in 2005). Tax law should allocate such reverse built-in gain or loss to the pre-
existing members of the arrangement, not to new members. 
 268. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006). It also accounts for reverse built-in gain or loss. See
Treas. Reg. §1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (as amended in 2005). 
 269. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 751(a) (2006) (providing that a distributee partner or seller of a 
partnership interest must recognize ordinary income for proportionate shares of partner-
ship property that will generate ordinary income upon disposition or collection); I.R.C. § 
754 (2006) (providing an election of adjustment to the basis of partnership property on dis-
tributions and sales of partnership interests).
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dependent residual risk. Arrangements with unitary residual risk 
should be disregarded; arrangements with allocation-dependent resi-
dual risk should be tax partnerships. The second dividing line be-
tween tax partnerships and tax corporations is distribution-
dependent residual risk. Arrangements with allocation-dependent re-
sidual risk should be tax partnerships; arrangements with distribu-
tion-dependent residual risk should be tax corporations. Finally, 
simple arrangements with allocation-distribution symmetry fall be-
tween tax partnerships and tax corporations. 
 The model also determines the appropriate tax regime to apply to 
the respective arrangements.  
 (1) Aggregate taxation should apply to disregarded arrangements. 
Such arrangements have unitary residual risk and can trace income 
from its source to the owner of that source. Aggregate taxation there-
fore suits disregarded arrangements.  
 (2) Aggregate-plus taxation should apply to tax partnerships. Such 
arrangements have allocation-dependent residual risk, and members 
can trace their shares of the arrangement’s income from the alloca-
tions. Aggregate-plus taxation therefore suits tax partnerships. Enti-
ty taxation should apply to tax corporations.  
 (3) Tax corporations, under the model, have distribution-
dependent residual risk, and the members cannot trace income from 
its source or from allocations. Therefore, entity taxation is the only 
available alternative.  
 (4) Finally, either aggregate-plus taxation or entity-minus taxa-
tion should apply to simple arrangements with allocation-
distribution symmetry. The members of such arrangements can allo-
cate items based on proportionate ownership. The arrangements are 
simple enough that they should not be required to adopt aggregate-
plus taxation. 
Aggregate 
Taxation 
Entity 
Taxation 
Entity-Minus 
Taxation 
Aggregate-Plus 
Taxation 
Figure 2
Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Business Arrangements 
Allocation-
Dependent Re-
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Distribution-
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Residual 
Risk 
Disregarded Ar-
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V.   CONCLUSION
 This Article argues that the classification of business arrange-
ments should be grounded in economic principle. Unfortunately, the 
current model for classifying tax entities disregards economics and 
instead relies on legal forms, labels, and taxpayer elections. The cur-
rent model’s unjustified reliance on such factors creates arbitrary 
distinctions between the various tax entities. The current model also 
ignores the policy reasons for the various entity tax regimes. As a 
consequence, the classification model subjects some arrangements to 
tax regimes that do not accurately place the tax burden. Taxpayer 
elections also allow well-advised taxpayers to shift the burden of tax 
to others. 
 This Article proposes a model for classifying tax entities that con-
siders the economic aspects of business arrangements. It also demon-
strates that economic theory helps explain why parties form business 
arrangements and how they use economic arrangements to reduce 
rent-seeking and agency costs. Tax law should recognize that use of 
economic arrangements and ensure that tax items follow economic 
items. The proposed model adopts residual risk as the preferred 
measure of each party’s economic situation and their shares of an ar-
rangement’s economic performance.  
 This Article introduces three types of residual risk—unitary resi-
dual risk, allocation-dependent residual risk, and distribution-
dependent residual risk—that help explain the need for the various 
tax regimes and suggest a natural classification model. In short, 
members of arrangements with unitary residual risk can trace in-
come from its source and should be subject to aggregate taxation. 
Members of arrangements with allocation-dependent residual risk 
can only trace income from allocations, so such arrangements should 
be subject to aggregate-plus taxation. Finally, arrangements with 
distribution-dependent risk cannot trace income from its source or al-
locations. Consequently, such arrangements should be subject to ent-
ity taxation. Thus, this Article recommends the residual-risk model 
for classifying business arrangements. 
VI.   APPENDIX OF TABLES
 The tables in this Appendix summarize the performance of a hy-
pothetical company and illustrate how agreements and state law 
affect parties’ residual risk. They provide information that this Ar-
ticle uses to illustrate the importance of the residual-risk model. 
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Year Profit
%  Profit  
Increase
Accum'd 
Profits
Property 
Apprec.
% Value 
Increase
Property 
Value
Residual 
Value
1,000,000
1 100,000     100,000     120,998     11.42% 1,120,998 1,220,998
2 99,712       -0.29% 199,712     80,634       6.95% 1,201,632 1,401,344
3 102,235     2.52% 301,947     (71,742)     -6.16% 1,129,890 1,431,837
4 106,772     4.54% 408,719     (88,170)     -8.12% 1,041,720 1,450,439
5 102,310     -4.46% 511,029     39,505       3.72% 1,081,225 1,592,254
6 98,030       -4.28% 609,059     25,334       2.32% 1,106,558 1,715,618
7 97,277       -0.75% 706,336     (41,315)     -3.81% 1,065,243 1,771,579
8 99,657       2.38% 805,993     (90,007)     -8.83% 975,236     1,781,229
9 98,858       -0.80% 904,851     41,184       4.14% 1,016,420 1,921,271
10 97,761       -1.10% 1,002,612 121,502     11.29% 1,137,922 2,140,534
Table 1
Hypothetical Business
 Table 1 tracks the business’s accumulated profits (Accum’d 
Profits). Because the arrangement makes no distributions, profits 
accumulate and become part of the business’s residual value. Ta-
ble 1 also tracks the value of the contributed property. The resi-
dual value equals accumulated profits plus the property value for 
each year.270
 The model uses Box-Muller computation to create the log-
normal distribution. With a mean of three percent and a standard 
deviation of six percent, the distribution skews slightly positive. 
The following table illustrates the derivation of the random 
changes in profit and property value. 
Inputs for Random Number Generation
profit % asset %
mean 3% 3%
standard deviation 6% 6%
rand1 rand2 r theta x1 x2 profit % asset %
1 0.678657765 0.309233857 1.506817 1.942972 -0.547943 1.403657778 -0.29% 11.42%
2 0.197032669 0.269166747 0.662482 1.691223 -0.079588 0.657684016 2.52% 6.95%
3 0.697949816 0.776469396 1.54736 4.878697 0.256154 -1.52601096 4.54% -6.16%
Uniform Random Numbers Intermediate Box-Muller Computations Random Numbers to Use
                                                                                                                    
 270. The author thanks Thomas J. Brennan and Brent Fisher for help creating this model. 
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 Table 2 summarizes the performance of the arrangement as a 
traditional partnership. Each party’s total allocation is the sum of 
the allocation of the percentage of profit (e.g., A’s % Profit) and 
property appreciation (e.g., A’s Apprec.). In Year 1, Adrian’s resi-
dual claim (A’s RC) is the sum of his contribution plus the alloca-
tions of profit and appreciation. Each subsequent year, the par-
ties’ residual claims adjust to reflect annual allocations. Bakke’s 
residual claim (B’s RC) is computed in the same manner as 
Adrian’s, but because Bakke made no contribution, his residual 
claim includes only his allocations of profits and appreciation. 
Profit/Loss Allocations
profit % appr %
A 55% 35%
B 45% 65%
100% 100%
Year
A's % 
Profit
A's %
Apprec.
A's Total
Allocation
B's % 
Profit
B's %
Apprec.
B's total
Allocation A's RC B's RC
1 55,000   42,349   97,349   45,000   78,649   123,649 1,097,349  123,649
2 54,842   28,222   83,064   44,871   52,412   97,282 1,180,413  220,931
3 56,229   (25,110)   31,119   46,006   (46,633)   (627) 1,211,532  220,304
4 58,724   (30,859)   27,865   48,047   (57,310)   (9,263) 1,239,397  211,041
5 56,271   13,827   70,097   46,040   25,678   71,718 1,309,495  282,759
6 53,916   8,867   62,783   44,113   16,467   60,580 1,372,278  343,340
7 53,502   (14,460)   39,042   43,775   (26,855)   16,920 1,411,320  360,259
8 54,811   (31,502)   23,309   44,845   (58,504)   (13,659) 1,434,629  346,600
9 54,372   14,414   68,786   44,486   26,770   71,256 1,503,415  417,856
10 53,769   42,526   96,294   43,993   78,976   122,969 1,599,709  540,825
Table 2
Partners' Residual Claims in Traditional Partnership
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Stock Ownership
Common P'fd
A 50 1000
B 50 0
100 1000
Preferred Contribution: 1,000,000
Preferred Coupon: 8%
Year
Pf'd Contr.
& Coupon RC Pf'd RC Cm'n A's RC B's RC
1 1,080,000 1,080,000 140,998     1,150,499 70,499
2 1,160,000 1,160,000 241,344     1,280,672 120,672
3 1,240,000 1,240,000 191,837     1,335,918 95,918
4 1,320,000 1,320,000 130,439     1,385,219 65,219
5 1,400,000 1,400,000 192,254     1,496,127 96,127
6 1,480,000 1,480,000 235,618     1,597,809 117,809
7 1,560,000 1,560,000 211,579     1,665,790 105,790
8 1,640,000 1,640,000 141,229     1,710,615 70,615
9 1,720,000 1,720,000 201,271     1,820,635 100,635
10 1,800,000 1,800,000 340,534     1,970,267 170,267
Table 3
Shareholders' Residual Claims
 Table 3 identifies the sum of the contribution on preferred 
stock and the preferred return (Pf’d Contr. & Coupon). Each year 
the amount increases by $80,000, or eight percent of the 
$1,000,000 contribution. The next column identifies the residual 
claim of the preferred stock (RC Pf’d), which always equals the 
sum of the preferred contribution and coupon. The next column 
presents the residual claim of the common stock (RC Cm’n). That 
amount is the excess of the corporation’s residual value (see Table 
1) over the residual claim of preferred shareholders. Because 
Adrian holds all of the preferred and half of the common stock, 
her residual claim (A’s RC) is the sum of the residual claim of the 
preferred stock and half of the residual claim of the common 
stock. Bakke’s residual claim (B’s RC) is one-half of the amount of 
residual claim of the common because Bakke holds half of the 
common stock. 
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Distribution Preferences
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
A return contribution 50%
B 50%
100%
Tier 2 Contribution: 1,000,000
Tier 1 Return: 8%
Year
Sum of 
Tier 1 & 2
Tier 1 & 2 
RC Tier 3 A's RC B's RC
A's 
Allocation
B's 
Allocation
1 1,080,000 1,080,000 140,998     1,150,499 70,499       150,499 70,499
2 1,160,000 1,160,000 241,344     1,280,672 120,672 130,173     50,173
3 1,240,000 1,240,000 191,837     1,335,918 95,918 55,246       (24,754)
4 1,320,000 1,320,000 130,439     1,385,219 65,219 49,301       (30,699)
5 1,400,000 1,400,000 192,254     1,496,127 96,127       110,908 30,908
6 1,480,000 1,480,000 235,618     1,597,809 117,809 101,682     21,682
7 1,560,000 1,560,000 211,579     1,665,790 105,790 67,981 (12,019)
8 1,640,000 1,640,000 141,229     1,710,615 70,615 44,825       (35,175)
9 1,720,000 1,720,000 201,271     1,820,635 100,635 110,021     30,021
10 1,800,000 1,800,000 340,534     1,970,267 170,267 149,631     69,631
Table 4
Partners' Residual Claim in Partnership with Target 
Allocations
 Table 4 identifies the sum of the Tier One and Tier Two distri-
butions (Sum of Tier 1 & 2). That amount equals the residual 
claim for the partner entitled to distributions under Tier One and 
Tier Two (Tier 1 & 2 RC). The Tier Three amount is the amount 
by which the residual value of the assets exceeds the residual 
claim of the Tier One and Tier Two members. Adrian’s residual 
claim (A’s RC) equals all of the Tier One and Tier Two amounts 
and half of the Tier Three amount. Bakke’s residual claim (B’s 
RC) equals half of the Tier Three amount. Adrian’s allocation (A’s 
Allocation) equals her residual claim minus her contribution (Year 
1) or her residual claim for the year minus her residual claim for 
the prior year (all years after Year 1). Bakke’s allocation (B’s Allo-
cation) equals his residual claim for the year minus his residual 
claim for the prior year. 
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Stock Ownership
Common
A 80
B 20
100
Year
Residual 
Value A's RC B's RC
1 1,220,998 976,798 244,200
2 1,401,344 1,121,075 280,269
3 1,431,837 1,145,469 286,367
4 1,450,439 1,160,351 290,088
5 1,592,254 1,273,803 318,451
6 1,715,618 1,372,494 343,124
7 1,771,579 1,417,263 354,316
8 1,781,229 1,424,983 356,246
9 1,921,271 1,537,017 384,254
10 2,140,534 1,712,427 428,107
Table 5
Shareholders' Residual Claims in a Corporation 
with a Single Class of Stock
 The residual value of the corporation in Table 5 is from Table 
1. Adrian’s residual claim (A’s RC) is eighty percent of the resi-
dual value; Bakke’s residual claim is twenty percent of the  
residual value. 
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Profit/Loss Allocations
profit % appr %
A 80% 80%
B 20% 20%
100% 100%
Year
A's % 
Profit
A's %
Apprec.
A's Total
Allocation
B's % 
Profit
B's %
Apprec
B's Total
Allocation A's RC B's RC
1 80,000       96,798       176,798 20,000       24,200       44,200       976,798 244,200     
2 79,770       64,507       144,277 19,942       16,127       36,069       1,121,075 280,269     
3 81,788       (57,394)     24,394       20,447       (14,348)     6,098         1,145,469 286,367     
4 85,417       (70,536)     14,881       21,354       (17,634)     3,720         1,160,351 290,088     
5 81,848       31,604       113,452 20,462       7,901         28,363       1,273,803 318,451     
6 78,424       20,267       98,691       19,606       5,067         24,673       1,372,494 343,124     
7 77,822       (33,052)     44,769       19,455       (8,263)       11,192       1,417,263 354,316     
8 79,725       (72,005)     7,720         19,931       (18,001)     1,930         1,424,983 356,246     
9 79,086       32,947       112,033 19,772       8,237         28,008       1,537,017 384,254     
10 78,209       97,201       175,410 19,552       24,300       43,853       1,712,427 428,107     
Table 6
Partners' Residual Claims in Partnership with Simple Allocations
 Adrian’s share of profit (A’s % of Profit) and share of apprecia-
tion (A’s % Apprec.) are each eighty percent of the total of each 
category. Adrian’s total allocation (A’s Total Allocation) is the sum 
of her share of profit and appreciation. The same method deter-
mines Bakke’s twenty percent allocation and total allocations. The 
parties’ residual claims include the parties’ interest in the proper-
ty plus their allocations. 
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Distribution Preferences
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
A return contribution 50%
B 50%
100%
Tier 2 Contribution: 1,000,000
Tier 1 Return: 8%
Year
Sum of 
Tier 1 & 2
Tier 1 & 2 
RC Tier 3 A's RC B's RC
A's 
Allocation
B's 
Allocation
1 1,080,000 1,080,000  20,000       1,090,000 10,000       90,000       10,000
2 1,160,000 1,160,000  39,712       1,179,856 19,856       89,856       9,856
3 1,240,000 1,240,000  61,947       1,270,974 30,974       91,117       11,117
4 1,320,000 1,320,000  88,719       1,364,359 44,359       93,386       13,386
5 1,400,000 1,400,000  111,029     1,455,515 55,515       91,155       11,155
6 1,480,000 1,480,000  129,059     1,544,530 64,530       89,015       9,015
7 1,560,000 1,560,000  146,336     1,633,168 73,168       88,638       8,638
8 1,640,000 1,640,000  165,993     1,722,996 82,996       89,828       9,828
9 1,720,000 1,720,000  184,851     1,812,425 92,425       89,429       9,429
10 1,800,000 1,800,000  340,534     1,970,267 170,267     157,842     77,842
Table 7
Partners' Residual Claim in Partnership with Target Allocations 
with Imperfect Information
 Table 7 is identical to Table 4, except the Tier Three amount in 
Table 7 is the amount by which the book value of the assets ex-
ceeds the residual claim of the Tier One and Tier Two members. 
The parties’ residual claims and allocations reflect the use of the 
different amount. 
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